Out of Sight, out of Mind: How Opportunity Cost Neglect Undermines Democracy by Lucas, Gary M., Jr
Texas A&M University School of Law
Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2015
Out of Sight, out of Mind: How Opportunity Cost
Neglect Undermines Democracy
Gary M. Lucas Jr
Texas A&M University School of Law, garylucasjr@law.tamu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gary M. Lucas Jr, Out of Sight, out of Mind: How Opportunity Cost Neglect Undermines Democracy, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 249 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/525
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & LIBERTY
OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND: How
OPPORTUNITY COST NEGLECT
UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY
Gary M. Lucas, Jr.*
ABSTRACT
Every government program has an opportunity cost, which con-
sists of the private and public goods that society must forgo to make
the program possible. In evaluating government programs, rational
voters would take opportunity costs into account. Unfortunately,
opportunity costs are usually implicit, and psychologists have shown
that decision makers tend to irrationally ignore implicit information
while giving too much weight to salient situational elements. This
Article presents evidence that the bias against implicit information
causes voters to neglect the opportunity costs of government pro-
grams. The Article also explains for the first time the implications of
opportunity cost neglect for democracy.
* Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. For helpful ideas and
suggestions, I thank participants in the Southeastern Association of Law Schools 2014
Annual Conference. I also thank Andy Morriss, Slavisa Tasic, and Max Sterns for com-
ments on an earlier draft and Carla Green and Shawna Young for research assistance.
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Voters' neglect of opportunity costs has far-reaching conse-
quences. Ignoring the sacrifices required by government programs
makes them more appealing. As a result, opportunity cost neglect
artificially increases the demand for government spending, tax ex-
penditures, and regulation. In particular, the failure to consider op-
portunity costs helps explain why the federal government's budget
is on an unsustainable path. Opportunity cost neglect causes voters
to demand a high level of government spending even though they
are unwilling to pay for it, which leads to chronic budget deficits.
Opportunity cost neglect also influences the government's choice
of policy instruments. Voters tend to support policies that conceal
tradeoffs. This explains why voters generally prefer tax expenditures
to similar direct spending programs. It also explains why, despite
economists' objections, voters prefer to address global warming
through command-and-control regulations rather than a more effi-
cient carbon tax.
In addition, voters' neglect of opportunity costs is relevant to the
debate over the proper role of government. Legal scholars usually
emphasize the market failures resulting from irrationality. They ar-
gue that irrational consumers make bad choices that justify paternal-
istic government intervention. But opportunity cost neglect and
other failures of rationality also result in government failure. Irra-
tional voters demand policies that they would otherwise oppose,
which results in substantial damage to society. Consequently, con-
trary to conventional wisdom, irrationality arguably strengthens the
case for limited government.
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Psychological research meticulously documents human failings,
including mental limitations and cognitive and emotional biases.'
Legal scholars, including scholars in the behavioral law and econom-
ics movement, have used this research to justify paternalism. 2 In par-
ticular, these scholars challenge the rational actor model of conven-
tional law and economics, including the notion that individuals act-
1 E.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 30-50
(2007); THOMAS GILOVICH ET AL., HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (2002); Cass Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1, 1-10 (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000); Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Mak-
ing, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587, 587-703 (John Kagel & Alvin
Roth eds., 1995).
2 For an introduction to behavioral law and economics, see Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 13-
58 (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000).
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ing in a free market will make optimal decisions without govern-
ment's help.3 As a result, law journals have in recent years published
a number of articles claiming that government should intervene in
the market to save people from their own irrational choices. 4
Because of their focus on market participants and paternalism,
most legal scholars have overlooked the possibility that irrationality
increases the risk of government failure.5 By contrast, scholars in the
emerging field of behavioral public choice conclude that irrationality
often causes voters to favor policies that they would not otherwise
support and that these policies are detrimental to the public interest.6
3 Id.
4 E.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(2008); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 30-50
(2007); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymo-
ron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:
Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211
(2003); Jonathan Gruber, Government Policy Toward Smoking: A View from Economics, 3
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHIcS 119 (2002).
5 Not all behavioral law and economics scholars have completely ignored the im-
plications of irrationality for democracy. On the contrary, several of these scholars
have made important contributions to the study of irrationality among voters, politi-
cians, bureaucrats, and judges. E.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); Cass Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000) [hereinafter, Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis]; Timur Kuran &
Cass Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999). But
the movement's primary focus has been on the ways in which irrationality causes mar-
kets to fail.
6 See generally Slavisa Tasic, The Modern Growth of Government Springs More from
Ideas Than from Vested Interests, 14 INDEP. REV. 549, 562-63 (2010) [hereinafter, Tasic,
Growth of Government]; David Hirshleifer, Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Reg-
ulation, 14 EUROPEAN FIN. MGMT. 856 (2008); BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE
RATIONAL VOTER (2007). Although this article focuses on irrationality among voters,
a related strand of literature focuses on irrationality among politicians and bureau-
crats. E.g., Gary Lucas, Jr., Paternalism and Psychic Taxes: The Government's Use of Nega-
tive Emotions to Save Us from Ourselves, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 227, 290-95 (2013);
Slavisa Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?, 17 J. DES ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES
1 (2011) [hereinafter, Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?]; Slavisa Tasic, The Illusion ofReg-
ulatory Competence, 21 CRITICAL REV. 423 (2009); Mario Rizzo & D. Glen Whitman, Little
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Research in behavioral public choice counsels caution and a healthy
skepticism toward government intervention. By ignoring this re-
search, legal scholars risk exaggerating the appropriate scope of gov-
ernment as well as advocating policies that are politically unrealistic
or even dangerous.
This Article contributes to the behavioral public choice literature
by explaining for the first time how opportunity cost neglect, which
is a particular failure of rationality, leads to government failure. The
rational actor model assumes that prior to choosing an option, deci-
sion makers consider its opportunity cost, which is the highest val-
ued alternative that the decision maker must forgo to pursue the op-
tion.7 A rational consumer choosing between a $1,000 stereo and a
$700 stereo would consider the best alternative use of the $300 that
she could save by purchasing the cheaper stereo. If the best alterna-
tive is downloading $300 worth of music from iTunes, then the con-
sumer would buy the more expensive stereo only if its enhanced fea-
tures make it more desirable than the cheaper stereo plus the music
downloads. This approach to decision making has considerable nor-
mative appeal. But several recent studies of consumer behavior sug-
gest that people often fail to think this way.8 Instead of focusing on
forgone alternatives, people frequently restrict their attention to the
focal option. They do not think about opportunity costs unless those
costs are obvious from the context in which the decision is made. As
a result, altering the context of a given decision by making oppor-
tunity costs more salient can change the outcome. Specifically, in-
creasing the salience of opportunity costs generally makes particular
Brother Is Watching You: New Paternalism on the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIz. L. REV. 685, 723-
35 (2009); Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (2006).
7 See infra Part II.
8 See infra Parts II and III.
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purchase opportunities appear less desirable. This reduces the like-
lihood that consumers will spend money and increases the likelihood
that when they do spend money, they will favor cheaper products
over more expensive ones.
Although the existing literature focuses on consumers, oppor-
tunity cost neglect has important consequences for democracy. Sys-
tematic neglect of opportunity costs causes government policy to de-
viate from what it would be if voters were rational.
Because this Article is about voter irrationality, Part I describes
in general terms how irrationality harms democracy. The remainder
of the Article focuses specifically on opportunity cost neglect. Part II
discusses the evidence of opportunity cost neglect among consumers
and argues that certain findings in the consumer literature suggest
that people are particularly unlikely to think about opportunity costs
when acting in their capacity as voters. Part III explains how oppor-
tunity cost neglect influences the public policies that voters support.
It also provides additional evidence that voters ignore opportunity
costs. Part IV discusses factors that aggravate or mitigate the effects
of opportunity cost neglect on public policy, including the im-
portance of politicians and of voters' use of heuristics. Because op-
portunity cost neglect affects consumers as well as political actors,
Part V considers whether it is more detrimental to the operation of
the free market or to democracy.
To preview the conclusions, opportunity cost neglect has im-
portant implications. First, the public's demand for government
spending is higher than it would be if voters were conscious of the
opportunity cost in terms of forgone private goods. Also, because
the public's support for government spending often stems from a
failure to consider the requisite tradeoffs, voters frequently will re-
fuse to support tax increases to pay for the spending that they de-
mand. This helps explain chronic government budget deficits and
why the federal government's budget is currently on an unsustaina-
ble path. In addition, voters will find tax expenditures, such as the
home mortgage interest deduction, particularly appealing because
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
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tax expenditures reduce the salience of opportunity costs vis-a-vis
direct spending programs.
Second, opportunity cost neglect affects voters' preferences re-
garding how the government should allocate any given level of pub-
lic funds. For example, empirical evidence suggests that voters sup-
port more military spending than they would if they considered the
opportunity cost in terms of forgone expenditures on other public
goods.
Third, voters' demand for government regulation is artificially
high because the opportunity costs of regulation are not obvious. In
addition, opportunity cost neglect helps explain why voters mistak-
enly prefer command-and-control regulations, such as fuel economy
standards, over more efficient corrective taxes, such as a carbon tax.
Fourth, because they often do not highlight opportunity costs,
public opinion polls that ask about government spending and regu-
lation do not elicit the responses that people would give if they were
rational. Specifically, most polls overstate public support for govern-
ment spending, tax expenditures, and regulation relative to what that
support would be if people did not neglect implicit tradeoffs.
Fifth, the effects of opportunity cost neglect are exacerbated by
certain other biases to which voters are prone, as well as voters' use
of heuristics. For example, the government's use of low-salience
taxes may cause voters to underestimate the actual dollar cost of gov-
ernment, in which case this error interacts with opportunity cost ne-
glect to increase the size of government beyond the level that rational
voters would support.
Sixth, the existence of opportunity cost neglect poses a significant
challenge to scholars who have proposed policies that would in-
crease support for government by making government's benefits
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
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more salient to voters.9 Any tendency that voters have to underesti-
mate the benefits of government will be partially, fully, or more than
fully offset by the countervailing force of opportunity cost neglect,
which causes government programs to appear less costly than they
otherwise would.
Finally, voters' support for government programs results more
from opportunity cost neglect than from careful consideration of the
programs' benefits and costs. Moreover, while opportunity cost ne-
glect probably impairs the operation of the free market, its adverse
effects on government may be more severe. As a result, opportunity
cost neglect provides a reason to evaluate proposals for government
intervention with caution and skepticism. It also suggests the possi-
bility that while the free market is imperfect, in some cases, it may be
the lesser of two evils.
I. How VOTER IRRATIONALITY HARMS DEMOCRACY
Law and economics uses the rational actor model to analyze legal
rules. According to that model, "[A]ll human behavior can be
viewed as involving participants who maximize their utility from a
stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of infor-
mation and other inputs in a variety of markets."10 In addition, ra-
tional actors have rational expectations, which means that they do
not err systematically." Since people are not omniscient and infor-
mation is costly, they sometimes make mistaken predictions. But
these mistakes are random and not biased in a particular direction.
9 E.g., Yair Listokin & David Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Govern-
ment Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAx L. REV. 179 (2013).
1o GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976).
11 For a review of the literature on rational expectations, see generally STEVEN
SHEFFRIN, RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS (2d ed., 1996). See also CAPLAN, supra note 6, at
98-99; Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 14-15.
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While the rational actor model yields useful insights, substantial
psychological research challenges the notion that the model accu-
rately describes human decision making and predicts people's be-
havior. 12 In particular, psychologists and behavioral economists
have shown that people suffer from biases that cause them to err sys-
tematically in certain circumstances. 13 Behavioral public choice ex-
amines the consequences of these findings for democracy."
To fully appreciate how irrationality harms democracy, we first
need to understand what motivates voters to support certain policies.
Empirical evidence suggests that voters often support policies that
they believe are in the public interest even if those policies do not
align with their own self-interest narrowly construed.15 In other
words, people often vote altruistically. 16 For example, young people
strongly support government programs for the elderly even if they
themselves do not have elderly parents and do not expect to rely
heavily on old-age programs when they retire. 7 Moreover, income
12 See supra note 1.
13 See supra note 1.
14 See supra note 6.
15 E.g., CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 148-51; Alan Blinder & Alan Krueger, What Does the
Public Know about Economic Policy, and How Does It Know It?, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY 327, 362-86 (2004); Bryan Caplan, Libertarianism against Economism:
How Economists Misunderstand Voters and Why Libertarians Should Care, 5 INDEP. REV.
539 (2001) [hereinafter Caplan, Economism]; Leonie Huddy et al., Compassion v. Self-
Interest: Support for Old-Age Programs among the Non-Elderly, 22 POL. PSYCH. 443 (2001);
Carolyn Funk, The Dual Influence of Self-Interest and Societal Interest in Public Opinion, 53
POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 37, 52-54 (2000); LEIF LEWIN, SELF-INTEREST AND
PUBLIC INTEREST IN WESTERN POLITICS 29-45 (1991); David Sears & Carolyn Funk, Self-
Interest in Americans' Political Opinions, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 147, 147-70 (Jane
Mansbridge ed., 1990); Jack Citrin & Donald Green, The Self-Interest Motive in American
Public Opinion, 3 RESEARCH IN MICROPOLITICS 1, 10-17 (1990).
16 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 148-51; see also Tasic, Growth of Government, supra note
6, at 549, 558.
17 Huddy et al., supra note 15, at 444, 451-62.
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has a "remarkably small" effect on political party identification. 18
Many rich people are Democrats, and many poor people are Repub-
licans, despite the perception that Democrats are more likely to raise
taxes on the rich and give money to the poor. 19
Altruistic voting flies in the face of conventional wisdom. Abun-
dant evidence suggests that people are largely selfish.20 For example,
Americans give away only about two percent of their incomes to
charity.2' If people are generally selfish, then why would they be-
come unselfish in the voting booth?
One possibility is that the personal consequences of many policy
proposals are not salient to most voters, and "when the costs and
benefits are obscure, support becomes increasingly unrelated to the
personal 'price."' 2 Consistent with this hypothesis, the few in-
stances in which researchers have found that self-interest plays a sig-
nificant role in voters' policy judgments generally involve proposals
for which the personal consequences are "1. visible, 2. tangible, 3.
18 Caplan, Economism, supra note 15.
19 For example, after controlling for race, income had very little influence over the
decision to vote for Barack Obama or Mitt Romney in the 2012 election. Alan
Abramowitz, The Minimal Class Divide in American Politics: Why Growing Income Ine-
quality Does Not Explain Partisan Polarization, SABOTO'S CRYSTAL BALL (May 1, 2014),
http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/the-minimal-class-divide-in-
american-politics/ (" African Americans, regardless of income, voted overwhelmingly
for Barack Obama. Whites with family incomes of greater than $150,000 were only
slightly more likely to vote for Mitt Romney than whites with family incomes of less
than $30,000.").
20 I generally agree with Bryan Caplan who, drawing upon evolutionary psychol-
ogy, argues that "altruism toward blood relatives in proportion to shared genetic in-
heritance [is] an expression of self-interest." Caplan, Economism, supra note 15; see also
RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 310-11 (1995) (making a simi-
lar argument).
21 Suzanne Perry, The Stubborn 2% Giving Rate, CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY, June
17, 2013, available at https://philanthropy.com/article/The-Stubborn-2-Giving-
Rate/139811/.
22 Citrin & Green, supra note 15, at 18.
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large, and 4. certain."23 For example, David Sears and Carolyn Funk
review evidence that self-interest influences taxpayer support for tax
cuts where the cuts are large and highly publicized and it is clear who
will benefit. 24 Nonetheless, Sears and Funk conclude that the "public
thinks about most political issues, most of the time, in a disinterested
frame of mind."23
A second explanation for voter altruism stems from two facts.
First, altruism is a consumption good that confers psychological and
reputational benefits. 26 Second, in an election with many voters, the
probability that one vote will decide the outcome is virtually zero.27
As a result, altruism in voting has almost no personal cost to the in-
dividual voter. In Bryan Caplan's words, "Voting to raise your taxes
by a thousand dollars when your probability of decisiveness is 1 in
100,000 has an expected cost of a penny." 28 So even if a particular
voter is aware that a certain policy would affect him adversely, he
may vote for a politician who favors that policy. Because his vote
will not be decisive, he can obtain the benefits of acting altruistically
without any personal sacrifice. Under these circumstances, "we
should expect voters to 'stuff themselves' with moral rectitude,"
which likely explains why wealthy Hollywood actors support Dem-
ocratic politicians who promise to increase their taxes substantially. 29
Voting for more redistribution allows people to acquire the benefits
of altruism at a much lower personal cost than they would incur by
actually donating their own money to charity.
2 Citrin & Green, supra note 15, at 18.
24 Sears & Funk, supra note 15, at 159-70.
25 Sears & Funk, supra note 15, at 170.
26 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 150.
27 DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1 304-05 (2003).
2 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 150.
29 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 151.
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If voters were rational, altruistic voting would generally have be-
nign effects. To understand why, first recognize that altruistic voters
support policies and politicians that they believe are best for society.
So a democracy comprised of altruistic voters will maximize social
welfare unless voters have mistaken beliefs about which policies and
politicians are in fact best.30
Would rational voters mistake bad policies and politicians for
good ones? Collecting and processing political information is costly,
and as already noted, a single vote rarely decides an election. So ra-
tional voters generally have no incentive to become informed about
politics and every incentive to remain "rationally ignorant."31 In fact,
empirical evidence confirms that many voters know little about pol-
itics and policy. 32 Because of their ignorance, rational voters might
make mistakes about what policies and politicians to support.
At first glance, rational ignorance seems troubling for democ-
racy. But the mistakes of rationally ignorant voters could very well
be inconsequential.33 Imagine an election between Candidate A and
Candidate B, and assume that Candidate A is objectively better for
the country as a whole. Rationally ignorant voters, if they vote at all,
must guess randomly as to which candidate is best. But because the
30 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 152.
31 The literature on rational ignorance is vast. For a recent review, see ILYA SOMIN,
DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 62-
89 (2013). For a textbook description of the concept, see JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL.,
MICROECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIc CHOICE 113-14 (2010). Finally, for a recent
critical review of the rational ignorance literature, see CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 94-
113.
32 E.g., SOMIN, supra note 31, at 17-61; MICHAEL DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER,
WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 62-104 (1996); Benja-
min Page & Robert Shapiro, The Rational Public and Democracy, in RECONSIDERING THE
DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 35, 37-39 (George Marcus & Russell Hanson eds., 1993) [herein-
after Page & Shapiro I].
33 DONALD WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE (1995); CAPLAN, supra
note 6, at 6-9, 94-113.
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guesses of rational voters are not biased in a particular direction, each
voter has a 50 percent chance of selecting either candidate. So if the
electorate is sufficiently large, the two candidates will split the vote
equally. Fortunately, for various reasons, some voters happened to
be informed. Perhaps political information is relevant to their jobs or
they view politics as a hobby. As long as at least some voters are
knowledgeable about politics and policy, they will be in a position to
break the tie among those who are rationally ignorant. Informed vot-
ers will know that Candidate A is superior. They will vote accord-
ingly, and the better candidate will win the election.
More generally, because rationality entails lack of systematic
bias, the errors of rationally ignorant voters will be random and will
tend to offset one another.M As a result, even if the informed voters
constitute a small fraction of the electorate, they will have dispropor-
tionate power, and government policies generally should reflect their
34 Because random errors tend to offset one another, many scholars claim that the
collective judgment of a group of people (e.g., voters) will generally be accurate even
if most of the individuals in the group are uninformed and error prone. This phenom-
enon is often referred to as the wisdom of crowds. For a recent review of the literature
on the wisdom of crowds, see Simmons et al., Intuitive Biases in Choice versus Estimation:
Implications for the Wisdom of the Crowds, 38 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 1, 1-2 (2010). See
also JAMES SUROWIEKl, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004); Tom Hoffman, Rationality Re-
conceived: The Mass Electorate and Democratic Theory, 12 CRIT. REV. 459,470 (1998); David
Austen-Smith & Jeffrey Banks, Information Aggregation, Rationality, and tile Condorcet
Jury Theorem, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 34, 34 (1996); WITTMAN, supra note 33, at 15-17;
Page & Shapiro I, supra note 32, at 40-41; Krishna Ladha, Condorcet's Jury Theorem in
Light of de Finetti's Theorem: Majority-Rule Voting with Correlated Votes, 10 SoC. CHOICE
& WELFARE 69 (1993); S. Berg, Condorcet's Jury Theorem, Dependency among Jurors, 10
SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 87 (1993); Philip Converse, Popular Representation and the Dis-
tribution ofInformation, in INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES369,377-85 (John
Ferejohn & James Kuklinski eds., 1990). For critiques of the wisdom-of-crowds hy-
pothesis, see SOMIN, supra note 31, at 110-17; Bryan Caplan, Majorities against Utility:
Implications of the Failure of the Miracle of Aggregation, 26 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 198 (2008)
[hereinafter Caplan, Majorities against Utility]; and CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 6-9.
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views.35 In other words, democracy will deliver results favored by
informed voters.
At this point, a critic of democracy might object that rationally
ignorant voters will in fact be systematically biased because their ig-
norance makes them vulnerable to propaganda. 36 Perhaps powerful
special interest groups aided by self-interested politicians and bu-
reaucrats can trick voters into supporting policies that conflict with
the public interest. But as long as they are rational, uninformed vot-
ers will be wary of political actors who have more information than
they do and who might be motivated by self-interest. Uninformed
voters will rationally discount propaganda so that special interest
groups and politicians cannot easily deceive them.37
The preceding analysis suggests that as long as voters are ra-
tional, democracy can work well even if most voters are uninformed.
Because they are generally altruistic, voters will support policies that
they believe promote the public interest, and their rationality ensures
that their policy judgments will not suffer from systematic errors.
This begs the question: are voters rational? If we define rational-
ity to include a lack of systematic bias, then a substantial amount of
evidence points to the conclusion that the answer is no. For instance,
Bryan Caplan provides evidence that voters suffer from various bi-
ases, including "antiforeign bias, a tendency to underestimate the
economic benefits of interaction with foreigners."3 8 Antiforeign bias,
3 See supra note 34.
36 For a summary of this argument, including citations to the relevant literature, see
CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 103-04.
3 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 103-06; Reiner Eichenberger & Angel Serna, Random
Errors, Dirty Information, and Politics, 86 PUB. CHOICE 137,142 (1996) (arguing that "sys-
tematic errors [by voters] are inconsistent with rational expectations"); WiTrMAN, su-
pra note 33, at 15.
38 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 36 (italics omitted); Bryan Caplan, Rational Ignorance
versus Rational Irrationality, 54 KYKLos 3, 15-16 (2001) [hereinafter Caplan, Rational Ir-
rationality].
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which stems from a deep-rooted suspicion of those who are different
from ourselves, causes voters to support tariffs and other protection-
ist policies that most economists believe reduce social welfare.39 An-
other example involves the availability heuristic, which is the ten-
dency to estimate the importance and frequency of an event based
upon how easy it is to recall examples of it.40 The availability heuris-
tic biases the public in favor of policies that address problems that
receive significant media attention, while neglecting problems that
are less newsworthy but that are also more important. 41
Voter irrationality is important because it skews elections and
government policies in the wrong direction.42 Returning to our hy-
pothetical election, if uninformed voters are biased in favor of Can-
didate B, then the two candidates will not split the uninformed vote
and the better candidate (Candidate A) may lose. In other words,
despite their good intentions, altruistic voters may cause democracy
to fail by introducing systematic bias into the policymaking pro-
cess.43
39 In a survey of members of the American Economic Association, 87.5% agreed that
the United States should eliminate tariffs and other trade barriers. Robert Whaples,
Do Economists Agree on Anything? Yes!, 3 ECON. VOICE 1, 1 (2004).
40 AMos TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 11 (Daniel Kahne-
man et al. eds., 1982).
41 Hirshleifer, supra note 6, at 866-67; Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 718.
42 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 9-11.
43 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 152-53. I define government failure as the deviation of
public policy from what it would be in a world populated by fully rational political
actors (including voters). Although this definition suffices for the limited purposes of
this article, I readily acknowledge its flaws. For example, the rational actor model
generally assumes that people have a single set of fixed preferences. In reality, peo-
ple's preferences may be subject to framing effects, time inconsistency, and similar
forces. In other words, people may have multiple preference sets, in which case it
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Bias among voters (whether informed or not) means that even if
politicians generally give the public the policies it wants, government
may fail to act in the public interest. The public's beliefs will be bi-
ased toward policies that voters would not support if they were ra-
tional. In other words, even though altruistic voters want the gov-
ernment to adopt policies that make society better off, irrationality
causes them to support policies that have the opposite effect. For
example, antiforeign bias causes voters to support tariffs because
they mistakenly believe that tariffs constitute good policy. Also, un-
like rational voters, irrational voters are gullible and susceptible to
propaganda and deceptive forms of persuasion.4 So voter irration-
ality creates an opportunity for politicians, bureaucrats, and special
interest groups to take advantage of the public.
Evidence of irrationality among voters has led behavioral public
choice scholars to conclude that voters often support policies that are
not in the public interest. As a result, behavioral public choice justi-
fies a healthy skepticism of government intervention, whether the in-
tervention is motivated by conventional market failures or by a pa-
ternalistic desire to save people from their own bad decisions.45
II. Opportunity Cost Neglect among Consumers
This Article contributes to the behavioral public choice literature
by presenting evidence that voters often neglect the opportunity
costs of government programs and by explaining how this particular
becomes difficult to determine their true preferences, including their policy prefer-
ences. In addition, public policy might not be welfare maximizing even if all political
actors were rational.
44 See infra Part IV.D.
4s E.g., Hirshleifer, supra note 6, at 856 ("[T]he behavioral approach in some ways
strengthens the case for laissez-faire, and raises some new doubts about the value of
regulation, because much regulation is driven by psychological bias-on the part of
the proponents, not necessarily the regulated."); CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 195-97.
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failure of rationality harms democracy. Because the existing litera-
ture on opportunity cost consideration focuses on consumers rather
than voters, Section A of this Part discusses evidence of opportunity
cost neglect with respect to consumption decisions and explains the
psychological theory as to why it occurs. Section B describes factors
that encourage consumers to consider opportunity costs spontane-
ously. Section C argues that certain findings in the consumer re-
search suggest that people are particularly likely to ignore oppor-
tunity costs when deciding how to vote. I will present more direct
evidence of voters' opportunity cost neglect in Part III.
A. Theory and Evidence
Economists often point out that prior to choosing an option, a
rational decision maker will consider its opportunity cost, which is
the highest valued alternative that the decision maker must forgo to
pursue that option.46 If a rational actor does not know every possible
alternative and learning about them is costly, she will search for bet-
ter alternatives until the expected cost of continuing the search out-
weighs the expected benefits. 47 But in the end, she will decide by
comparing the focal option to its best known alternative. Moreover,
46 E.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMIcs 6 (4th ed., 2007)
("When making any decision ... decision makers should be aware of the opportunity
costs that accompany each possible action."); DAVID BESANKO & RONALD
BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICs 223-27 (2nd ed., 2005); ARMEN ALCHIAN, COST, IN
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 404-15, 404 (1968) ("In eco-
nomics, the cost of an event is the highest-valued opportunity necessarily foresaken.");
JAMES BUCHANAN, COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN, VOL. 6, COST AND
CHOICE: AN INQUIRY IN ECONOMIC THEORY (1969); see also Richard Larrick et al., Who
Uses the Cost-Benefit Rules of Choice? Implications for the Normative Status of Microeco-
nomic Theory, 56 ORG. BEHAVIOR & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 331, 334 (1993) [here-
inafter Larrick et al. 1].
7 For a classic discussion of the economics of information, see George Stigler, The
Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
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for decisions that involve spending money, a rational actor should be
able to readily identify the opportunity costs. As Erica Okada and
Stephen Hoch explain, "Money has a readily exchangeable market,
is highly liquid and fungible, and can be saved. A dollar is a dollar.
. . and so what comes to mind as the next best use for money remains
fairly constant across situations."48
Consistent with economists' claims about the normative appeal
of considering opportunity costs, the evidence suggests that people
who think about opportunity costs make better decisions. People
who have a propensity to plan for the use of money (which may re-
flect greater consideration of opportunity costs) have higher credit
scores than those who do not.4 9 Moreover, Richard Larrick and his
colleagues find that the use of cost-benefit reasoning, including con-
sidering opportunity costs, increases with intelligence and is associ-
ated with better grades in college and a higher salary.50 Finally, ex-
perimental evidence suggests that considering opportunity costs
leads people to make decisions that are consistent with the decisions
they make when they have full information about all available pur-
chase options.5 1
48 Erica Okada & Stephen Hoch, Spending Time versus Spending Money, 31 J.
CONSUMER RESEARCH 313 (2004).
49 John Lynch, Jr. et al., A Generalizable Scale of Propensity to Plan: The Long and the
Short of Planning for Time and Money, 37 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 108,122-23, 125 (2010).
5 Larrick et al. I, supra note 46, at 338-43.
51 Stephen Spiller, Opportunity Cost Consideration, 38 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 595,
600, 607 (2011). Spiller discusses the possibility that opportunity cost consideration
may make consumers less happy. Id. at 606. Because it involves focusing on tradeoffs,
considering opportunity costs may produce negative emotions by making each alter-
native appear worse than it would have absent the comparison. Id. While this may be
true, it does not mean that ignoring opportunity costs leads to better decisions. The
evidence presented in the text suggests the opposite. Instead, ignoring opportunity
costs may be convenient in the short run but disastrous in the long run. See id. Re-
gardless, this Article focuses on opportunity cost neglect among voters. Even if ignor-
ing the opportunity costs of certain policies makes a particular voter happier, that does
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Nonetheless, people often neglect opportunity costs, particularly
if those costs are not obvious from the way in which a choice is
framed. As a result, researchers have found that they are able to in-
fluence people's choices simply by manipulating the decision frame
in a way that makes opportunity costs more salient.
Opportunity cost neglect is a specific instance of a more general
phenomenon. When making decisions, people often passively accept
the frame or characterization of the problem provided to them. They
restrict their thoughts to salient situational elements, especially infor-
mation explicitly presented. 52 People often ignore relevant infor-
mation that remains implicit.
This means that when faced with a decision whether to buy a
particular product, people frequently focus on the product itself ra-
ther than considering other options.53 Restricting thoughts to the fo-
cal option can lead to a bad decision. In many cases, the focal option
will have features that are predominantly positive either because the
not mean that society will be better off. In fact, the opposite will be true because voters
who ignore opportunity costs impose substantial social costs. See infra Part V.
52 For reviews of the literature, see Spiller, supra note 51, at 596; Shane Frederick et
al., Opportunity Cost Neglect, 36 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 553, 553-54 (2009); and Daniel
Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 1449, 1458-60 (2003). See also, Dennis Chong & James Druckman, Framing
Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCL 103 (2007) (discussing the influence of framing effects
on public opinion).
Frederic Bastiat anticipated this particular insight of modern psychology over 160
years ago. See Frederic Bastiat, That Which Is Seen, and That Which Is Not Seen, in 1 THE
BASTIAT COLLECrION 1 (Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007).
53 See generally Frederick et al., supra note 52; Steven Posavac et al., Blissful Insularity:
When Brands Are Judged in Isolation of Competitors, 16 MKTG. LETTERS 87 (2005) [herein-
after Blissful Insularity]; Steven Posavac et al., The Brand Positivity Effect: When Evalua-
tion Confers Preference, 31 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 643 (2004) [hereinafter Brand Positiv-
ity Effect].
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product itself is inherently attractive or because the seller's market-
ing techniques make it appear so.M As a result, consumers consider-
ing the focal option without reference to alternatives are biased in
favor of it. In other words, they are more likely to purchase the focal
option if they do not think about other uses of their money that may
be superior.
Two types of evidence support the hypothesis that consumers
often ignore implicit opportunity costs when making purchasing de-
cisions.55 The first is the fact that researchers are able to manipulate
5 Steven Posavac and his colleagues have identified a focal brand favorableness
bias, which is related to opportunity cost neglect. When people consider a particular
product brand in isolation, they judge it more favorably then if they consider it in con-
nection with other brands of the same product. Posavac argues that the brand posi-
tivity effect results from selective hypothesis testing. Ideally, when evaluating an hy-
pothesis, people would engage in comparative processing in which they consider all
possible hypotheses and reach a conclusion. Instead, real people engage in selective
processing, which is faster and less cognitively demanding. They evaluate only one
focal hypothesis. Unfortunately, the evaluation is often biased because people search
for information that supports the focal hypothesis and neglect information that rejects
it, including competing hypotheses. Specific hypotheses that people consider are often
prompted by the decision making context. Consumers are motivated to hold correct
attitudes and make satisfying decisions so they are likely to evaluate products that
catch their attention through hypothesis testing. Because consumers want to find
good options, because most brands are good at performing their basic functions, and
because brands are usually brought to consumers' attention through ads and packag-
ing that are favorable, the consumer's hypothesis is likely to be that the focal brand is
favorable. Blissful Insularity, supra note 53 and Brand Positivity Effect, supra note 53; see
also David Sanbonmatsu et al., Selective Hypothesis Testing, 5 PSYCH. BULL. & REV. 197
(1998).
ss There is also substantial evidence that people often neglect opportunity costs
when making managerial decisions. See generally Sandra Vera-Munoz, The Effects of
Accounting Knowledge and Context on the Omission of Opportunity Costs in Resource Allo-
cation Decisions, 73 ACCOUNTING REV. 47 (1998); Gregory Northcraft & Margaret Neale,
Opportunity Costs and the Framing of Resource Allocation Decisions, 37 ORG. BEHAVIOR &
HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 348 (1986); Robert Hoskin, Opportunity Cost and Behavior,
21 J. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 78 (1983); Laurence Friedman & Bruce Neumann, The
Effects of Opportunity Costs on Project Investment Decisions: A Replication and Extension,
18 J. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 407 (1980); Bruce Neumann & Laurence Friedman, Op-
portunity Costs: Further Evidence Through an Experimental Replication, 16 J. ACCOUNTING
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consumption choices by altering the decision frame in a way that
prompts consideration of alternatives. For example, Steven Jones
and his colleagues asked their subjects to decide whether they would
use a $15 gift to buy a CD from one of their favorite bands.56 Prior to
making their decision, the researchers asked some subjects to gener-
ate alternative uses for the money, while other subjects were not
asked about alternatives.57 Jones found that subjects who were not
asked to generate alternatives were substantially more likely to want
to purchase the CD than those asked to generate alternatives.58 In the
absence of a specific instruction to consider the opportunity cost of
buying the CD, many subjects apparently ignored the cost, which
made the CD more attractive than it otherwise would have been.
RESEARCH 400 (1978); Selwyn Becker et al., Opportunity Costs-An Experimental Ap-
proach, J. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 317 (1974). While these studies are not as relevant
to this Article as those that focus on consumption decisions, the studies on managerial
decision making provide additional evidence that people often fail to consider oppor-
tunity costs in a variety of circumstances.
56 Several of the experiments discussed in this Part and in Part III, including Jones's
experiment, involved hypothetical choices. Perhaps consumers are more likely to con-
sider opportunity costs when choices are consequential because of greater incentives
for doing so. Nonetheless, Shane Frederick's coffee mug experiment discussed in the
text infra Part III.A.1 involved a consequential choice, not a hypothetical, and Frederick
still found evidence of opportunity cost neglect. Similarly, Stephen Spiller has found
evidence of opportunity cost neglect among real consumers outside the laboratory.
See infra Part II.B.1.
In any event, the primary focus of this article is on opportunity cost neglect among
voters, not consumers. Even if consumers become more likely to consider opportunity
costs as the stakes increase, that would not tell us much about voters. A recurring
theme throughout this Article is that because a single vote is unlikely to decide an
election, voters have no incentive to think about the opportunity costs of government.
In that sense, low-stakes experiments involving hypothetical scenarios do not differ
substantially from the context in which people make voting decisions.
5 Steven Jones et al., Choices and Opportunities: Another Effect of Framing on Decisions,
11 J. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 211, 220-22 (1998).
s Id. at 220-21.
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In a similar experiment, Shane Frederick gave subjects two
choices-either buy a video for $14.99 or not buy it.59 For some sub-
jects, the "not buy" option was worded as "Not buy this entertaining
video;" but for others, the wording included the phrase "Keep the
$14.99 for other purchases." 60 The latter decision frame, which Fred-
erick used to cue consideration of opportunity costs, caused willing-
ness to purchase to fall from 75% to 55%.61
Importantly, the rational actor model does not predict this dis-
parity in behavior. The two decision frames in Frederick's experi-
ment contain the same information. Even without an explicit re-
minder, a rational actor should recognize that "[n]ot buy[ing] this en-
tertaining video" means "[k]eep[ing] the $14.99 for other purchases."
Yet many of Frederick's subjects failed to make this seemingly obvi-
ous connection. This is consistent with the notion that decision mak-
ers frequently ignore implicit information, including opportunity
costs.
The second type of evidence for opportunity cost neglect is ex-
perimental evidence that suggests that in making consumption deci-
sions, people rarely think about outside goods. Frederick and his
colleagues presented their subjects with a choice between a $1,000
stereo and a $700 stereo. They found that in the absence of a cue
prompting them to do so, only 13% of subjects mentioned outside
goods (e.g., "I'll have $300 left over for shopping for clothes") as a
factor influencing their decision.62 Similarly, Thomas Brown found
that less than 10% of his study participants referred to outside goods
59 Frederick et al., supra note 52, at 554.
60 Frederick et al., supra note 52, at 554-55.
61 Frederick et al., supra note 52, at 554-55.
62 Frederick et al., supra note 52, at 557.
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when they were asked to describe how they determined their will-
ingness to pay for certain items.6
B. Factors Contributing to Opportunity Cost Consideration
Consumers often neglect opportunity costs, but not always. The
research on spontaneous consideration of opportunity costs is rele-
vant to this Article because the circumstances that cause consumers
to think about opportunity costs are generally absent from the voting
context. This suggests that voters are particularly likely to ignore the
opportunity costs of government programs.
Immediate Resource Constraints
People become more likely to consider opportunity costs when
they face immediate resource constraints. Absent immediate re-
source constraints, any particular expenditure does not clearly entail
sacrificing another purchase. 6 In other words, "the amount of
money the consumer has at his disposal is vague so tradeoffs are
rarely explicit."65 But if money is tight, then the consumer must care-
fully consider which options to pursue and which to reject. 66 So im-
mediate resource constraints supply the necessary incentive to force
people to think about opportunity costs.
Stephen Spiller presents survey and experimental evidence con-
sistent with this hypothesis. Spiller shows that the length of a per-
son's pay cycle affects opportunity cost consideration. 67 Holding to-
6 Thomas Brown, Loss Aversion without the Endowment Effect, and Other Explanations
for the WATA-WTP Disparity, 57 J. EcON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 367, 373 (2005).
64 Frederick et al., supra note 52, at 559.
65 Frederick et al., supra note 52, at 559.
6 Frederick et al., supra note 52, at 559.67 Spiller, supra note 51, at 598-601.
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tal income constant, people with long pay cycles (e.g., monthly) re-
ceive larger paychecks than those with short pay cycles (e.g.,
weekly). So immediately after receiving their pay, those with longer
pay cycles face reduced immediate resource constraints, and Spiller
finds that they are also less likely than those with shorter pay cycles
to consider opportunity costs when spending money. 68 Similarly,
Spiller presents experimental evidence showing that subjects given a
larger amount of money to spend are less likely to consider oppor-
tunity costs than subjects given a smaller amount of money. 69
Accessibility
Spiller argues that opportunity costs become more accessible in
two circumstances. The first is when consumers associate a resource
with a typical use.70 Spiller finds that people using a Starbucks gift
card to make a purchase are more likely to think about alternative
beverages that they might purchase than alternative foods.7 1 People
associate Starbucks with beverage purchases, so using the gift card
triggers thoughts of beverage opportunity costs, but not of food op-
portunity costs.72
The second circumstance increasing accessibility occurs when a
resource has limited uses. 73 Specifically, Spiller contends that con-
sumers are more likely to consider opportunity costs when using gift
cards that are associated with a narrow category of purchases than
when using money.74 Contrary to the conventional wisdom ex-
pressed above, alternative products do not come readily to mind
68 Spiller, supra note 51, at 598-601.
69 Spiller, supra note 51, at 601-03.
7o Spiller, supra note 51, at 597.
71 Spiller, supra note 51, at 603-04.
n Spiller, supra note 51, at 603-04.
7 Spiller, supra note 51, at 597.
74 Spiller, supra note 51, at 597.
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when thinking of money because money is tied to so many uses that
it often does not prompt thoughts about any of those uses.75 Spiller
offers experimental evidence to support this claim, including evi-
dence that people consider opportunity costs when using a Starbucks
gift card but not when using a cash-like Visa gift card. 76 The Visa gift
card does not make opportunity costs readily accessible because un-
like the Starbucks card, people do not associate the Visa card with a
particular type of purchase.
Economics Training
Researchers have found that training can be an effective tool for
improving people's ability to reason? In particular, Richard Larrick
and his colleagues find that formal training in economics is associ-
ated with the use of cost-benefit rules in every-day decision making,
including consideration of opportunity costs.78
C. What These Findings Suggest about Voters
If people sometimes act irrationally in their capacity as consum-
ers, then we should not be surprised if they are even more irrational
7s Spiller, supra note 51, at 597.
76 Spiller, supra note 51, at 604-05.
7 For a review of the literature, see Richard P. Larrick, Debiasing, in BLACKWELL
HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISIONMAKING 324 (Derek Koehler & Nigel Harvey
eds., 2004).
7 Richard Larrick et al., Teaching the Use of Cost Benefit Reasoning in Everyday Life, 1
PSYCH. SC. 362, 365-66 (1990); Larrick et al. I, supra note 46, at 344 (1993).
In addition to those with economics training, people who have a general propensity
to plan for the use of their money, e.g., by setting financial goals, are more likely to
consider opportunity costs regardless of the particular circumstances of their decision.
Spiller, supra note 51, at 596-97, 605; see also Frederick et al., supra note 52, at 558 (find-
ing that "tightwads" who experience a greater "pain of paying" are less susceptible to
opportunity cost manipulations and suggesting that this is because tightwads are
more likely to consider opportunity costs that are not explicit).
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in their capacity as voters. People make consumption decisions
every day and consumers are often well informed about their op-
tions.79 Moreover, consumption decisions have both immediate and
long-term consequences for the consumer, giving him a strong incen-
tive to overcome any irrational tendencies. On the other hand, voters
are usually uninformed, a single vote is rarely decisive, and decisions
about government policy are usually unfamiliar and difficult. Under
these circumstances, irrationality in voting is likely common.80
Consistent with this hypothesis, certain findings related to con-
sumers' neglect of opportunity costs suggest that people are particu-
larly likely to ignore the opportunity costs of government programs.
In the consumer research on opportunity costs, the primary finding
is that if opportunity costs are implicit, then people are unlikely to
consider them. For government programs, receipt of goods and ser-
vices is often separated from payment, so the opportunities forgone
to provide those goods and services are especially likely to remain
implicit. In other words, the fact that payment and receipt of gov-
ernment goods and services are not contemporaneous reduces the
likelihood that voters will think about opportunity costs.
People do sometimes think about implicit tradeoffs. But the fac-
tors that facilitate spontaneous consideration of opportunity costs are
noticeably absent when it comes to voting. First, voters do not face
7 Steven Posavac and his colleagues find that consumers who are very familiar
with a product category (e.g., first-class hotels) are less likely to exhibit focal brand
favorableness bias, which is related to opportunity cost neglect. Blissful Insularity, su-
pra note 53, at 93. The authors speculate that a consumer with substantial knowledge
of a product category would likely be able to readily generate information about mul-
tiple alternatives. Blissful Insularity, supra note 53, at 92.
80 Cf JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 262 (1950)
("Thus the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon
as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would read-
ily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive
again.").
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immediate resource constraints. A voter can support politicians who
promise to provide more government goods and services without
jeopardizing other purchases that he (the voter) might make with his
own funds. Since his vote will not decide the election, a particular
voter's taxes will be the same regardless of which politicians and pol-
icies he supports.
Second, the opportunity costs of government programs are
vague and inaccessible. Voters pay taxes with money. Unlike a
Starbucks gift card, money is not a limited-use resource associated
with a narrow category of purchases. Spending money often is not
enough to trigger thoughts about alternative opportunities. The op-
portunity costs of government spending would likely be more salient
if taxpayers paid their taxes using gift cards from their favorite stores
rather than money. Moreover, even if paying taxes does sometimes
cause voters to consider opportunity costs, the government may
structure taxes in ways that reduce their salience.8' If people are not
aware of how much tax that they and their fellow citizens pay, then
they cannot consider the opportunity costs of government programs
even if they would otherwise be inclined to do so.
Finally, formal training in economics may ingrain the habit of
considering opportunity costs. But most voters do not have econom-
ics training.
III. OPPORTUNITY COST NEGLECT AND VOTERS' POLICY
PREFERENCES
This Part discusses how neglect of the opportunity costs of gov-
ernment programs influences the policies that voters support. It also
provides additional evidence that voters ignore opportunity costs.
81 See infra IV.A.5.
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Voters' failure to think about opportunity costs is important because
substantial empirical evidence confirms that public opinion signifi-
cantly influences government policy. 82
A. GOVERNMENT SPENDING
With respect to government spending, considering opportunity
costs would mean that instead of evaluating a spending proposal in
isolation, voters would compare it with alternative uses of the money
in question. What are the likely consequences if voters fail to think
about alternatives to government spending? Will spending be too
high relative to a world populated by rational voters? Will the gov-
ernment misallocate its funds? This Section addresses those ques-
tions.
Lessons from the Research on Consumer Spending
The consumer research on opportunity cost neglect is helpful in
thinking about government spending. When consumers think about
buying an otherwise appealing product (such as a new stereo), they
tend to ignore the implicit opportunity costs of making the purchase.
So, when researchers frame the decision to prompt consideration of
opportunity costs, the probability that subjects will buy the product
in question generally decreases. Recall that Steven Jones and his col-
leagues found that asking subjects to generate alternative uses for
their money substantially reduced willingness to purchase a $15
CD.83 Similarly, Shane Frederick and his colleagues found that they
could substantially reduce subjects' willingness to purchase a video
simply by mentioning that their failure to buy the video would allow
subjects to keep the money for other purchases.8
82 See infra IV.B.
83 Jones et al., supra note 57, at 220-21.
8 Frederick et al., supra note 52, at 554.
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Moreover, when prompted to consider opportunity costs, con-
sumers become more likely to choose a cheaper option over a more
expensive one. In one experiment, Frederick and his colleagues
asked subjects to choose between a $1,000 stereo and a $700 stereo
after first listing all of the advantages and disadvantages they could
generate for each option.85 For those subjects in the opportunity cost
condition, Frederick worded the option to purchase the cheaper ste-
reo in a way that made clear that doing so would leave the subject
with $300. The researchers did not make this point explicit to subjects
in the control condition. Frederick found that subjects in the oppor-
tunity cost condition were more likely to purchase the cheaper op-
tion. In addition, 30 percent of the subjects in the opportunity cost
condition mentioned outside goods (e.g., "I'll have $300 left over for
shopping for clothes") as a factor influencing their decision com-
pared to only 13% of subjects in the control condition. And consid-
eration of outside goods apparently did influence choice because
"the mention of outside goods was a significant mediator of stereo
choice."8 6
In another experiment, Frederick gave college students $10 and
offered them a choice between a $10 coffee mug and one that cost
$3.99.87 For half the students, the description of the cheaper mug in-
cluded the phrase "leaving you with an extra $6.01 in cash to spend
on something else."88 Including this phrase increased the percentage
of students choosing the cheaper mug from 40% to 60%.89
85 Frederick et al, supra note 52, at 554.
8 Frederick et al, supra note 52,at 557.
87 Frederick et al, supra note 52, at 556.
88 Frederick et al, supra note 52, at 556.
89 At this point, a caveat is in order. Researchers have found that in some cases,
thinking about alternative options may not reduce willingness to purchase the focal
option and may even increase it. Specifically, if the alternatives considered are them-
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In addition, there is evidence that people who regularly consider
opportunity costs are better able to control their spending. Scott Rick
selves unappealing, then thinking about them may not make the focal option less at-
tractive. For example, in his stereo experiment, Frederick found that he could reduce
the effects of mentioning the $300 savings from purchasing the cheaper stereo simply
by suggesting that subjects might spend the money they saved on a weekend trip to
Des Moines, Iowa (an obviously unattractive option). Frederick et al, supra note 52, at
558.
Nonetheless, the circumstances in which considering opportunity costs increases
rather than reduces willingness to spend are likely very limited. The experiments
finding this effect highlight unattractive alternatives or else otherwise artificially limit
the alternatives that subjects are likely to consider. The Frederick experiment, for ex-
ample, drew attention to a particularly unappealing option. See also Spiller, supra note
51, at 599-600 (finding that consumers who were presented with unappealing alterna-
tives to the focal purchase option became more likely to purchase that option). In fact,
a trip to Iowa was not the alternative that his subjects would have thought about if
they were rational. The normatively appropriate option for them to consider would
have been the best alternative use for the $300 that they would save by purchasing the
cheaper stereo. Moreover, when researchers do not highlight unappealing options but
instead simply prompt their subjects to think about alternatives that they themselves
generate, people become less likely to purchase the focal option.
Another circumstance in which considering alternatives may increase willingness
to spend involves situations in which the focal option is predominantly negative rather
than positive. In one experiment, Steven Jones and his colleagues gave subjects a hy-
pothetical scenario that concluded by asking them whether they would pay $1,000 to
repair a broken down car. Subjects who were not asked to generate alternatives to
repairing the car were less likely to choose the repair option than those asked to gen-
erate alternatives. Jones concluded that considering alternatives to a negative option
makes it more attractive because many of the alternatives are also negative. Jones et
al., supra note 57, at 219-23.
Although interesting, this finding does not undermine the conclusion that oppor-
tunity cost neglect will generally cause voters to irrationally support more government
spending. The reason is that the public generally views spending on particular gov-
ernment programs in a predominately positive light, not a negative one. See infra Part
III.A.2. In other words, spending money on government programs like Social Security
and the military is more akin to buying a stereo than repairing a broken car. And
when people face a predominantly positive option, such as spending on Social Secu-
rity or buying a stereo, opportunity cost neglect increases the probability that they will
select that option.
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and his colleagues have developed a scale that measures the diver-
gence between a person's actual and desired levels of spending. 90
Using this scale, Rick identifies as spendthrifts people who by their
own admission have substantial difficulty controlling their spending.
In his stereo experiment, Shane Frederick found that people who sat-
isfy Rick's definition of spendthrifts were especially responsive to the
manipulation of opportunity cost salience. 91 Simply adding the
phrase "leaving you with $300 in cash" to the description of the
cheaper stereo more than doubled the percentage of spendthrifts
who chose it. Frederick suggests that spendthrifts are particularly
prone to ignore implicit opportunity costs. As a result, increasing
opportunity cost salience dramatically affects their purchasing deci-
sions. If Frederick is correct, then we can conclude that consideration
of opportunity costs leads to less spending; Rick found that spend-
thrifts are significantly less likely than other people to save money
and more likely to have credit card debt.92
To summarize, the consumer research finds that people who con-
sider opportunity costs are less likely to spend freely. Extrapolating
from these results suggests that voters' neglect of opportunity costs
increases support for government spending. Failing to think about
tradeoffs makes government goods and services appear more desir-
able than they otherwise would.93
At this point, I should note that voters' tendency to neglect op-
portunity costs does not definitively prove that the current level of
9 See generally Scott Rick et al., Tightwads and Spendthrifts, 34 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH
767 (2008).
91 Frederick et al., supra note 52, at 558.
92 Rick et al., supra note 90, at 774-75.
93 Cf Sanbonmatsu, supra note 54, at 209 ("Findings in both the psychological and
economics literatures indicate that the preference for a valued option may be inflated
when the option is considered singularly or in isolation.")
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government spending is too high relative to a world in which all vot-
ers are rational. Voters might suffer from other failures of rationality
that counteract the effects of opportunity cost neglect. I address this
possibility in Part IV. For now, my goal is simply to show that op-
portunity cost neglect is a real and powerful phenomenon that biases
voters in favor of government spending.
Public Opinion Research on Government Spending
Opinion polls provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis
that voters generally ignore the opportunity costs of government
spending and that this increases the demand for it. The Pew Re-
search Center periodically asks the public whether spending on cer-
tain government programs should increase, decrease, or stay the
same. Pew consistently finds that large majorities (in some cases ap-
proaching 90% of respondents) support either maintaining or in-
creasing spending on nearly all major government programs, includ-
ing Social Security, health care, national defense, education, combat-
ing crime, environmental protection, and aid to the needy in the
United States.94
In its 2013 poll, Pew found that even among Republicans, a ma-
jority supported cutting spending in only two of nineteen areas - aid
to the world's needy and unemployment assistance - both of which
constitute a small portion of the federal government's budget.95 In
other words, Pew found broad-based support for virtually every fed-
eral spending program, including strong support among people who
identify with the political party that is generally associated with a
desire to reduce government spending. This finding is particularly
9 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, As SEQUESTER DEADLINE LOOMs, LITLE SUPPORT FOR
CUTrING MOST SPENDING 10 (2013) (surveying adults) [hereinafter PEW, SUPPORT FOR
CUTTING SPENDING].
95 Id. at 3.
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surprising given that we live in an era in which the media and poli-
ticians frequently discuss the federal budget deficit and the need for
either significant spending reductions or tax increases. Moreover,
broad-based support for spending programs contradicts the notion
that the federal budget deficit results from lack of agreement among
Democrats and Republicans about what specific programs the gov-
ernment should cut. At least when it comes to particular programs,
even Republican voters express little desire for less government.
And this finding is not unique to the 2013 Pew poll. A recent review
of public opinion research regarding attitudes toward government
spending concluded the following:
This research shows broad support for federal involvement
in the provision of social goods and services. The idea that
the government should play a role in providing housing for
the poor, pensions for the elderly, education for all children,
and a variety of other social benefits is popular with the pub-
lic, even among Republicans and Conservatives. 96
For purposes of this Article, Pew's questions about government
spending are valuable because they do not contain cues that would
prompt respondents to consider opportunity costs. As a result, we
96 Christopher Faricy & Christopher Ellis, Public Attitudes Toward Social Spending in
the United States: The Difference between Direct Spending and Tax Expenditures, 36 POL.
BEHAVIOR 53, 56-57 (2014); see also, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION, & HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT POLL, ATTITUDES
TOWARD GOVERNMENT 18, 23 (2000), available at http:// kaiserfamilyfounda-
tion.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/npr-kaiser-kennedy-school-poll-attitudes-to-
ward-government.pdf (finding that a majority of adults had a favorable opinion of all
seven federal government programs they were asked about and that large majorities
favored the same or more federal government involvement in eight different areas
ranging from ensuring clean air and water to setting minimum education standards
for schools).
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can compare the response to Pew's questions with other polls that
are worded to bring tradeoffs to mind, in particular the many polls
that ask whether the government should cut spending on certain pro-
grams to reduce the federal budget deficit. Polls that refer to deficit
reduction generally find more support for spending cuts than Pew
finds in its polls. For example, since 1994, support for cutting defense
spending has ranged from 5% to 30% in Pew's polls. 97 But polls that
focus attention on deficit reduction find as many as 64% of respond-
ents supporting defense cuts.98 Mentioning deficit reduction has a
similar but less dramatic effect on support for cutting Medicare and
Social Security. 99 This suggests that mentioning deficit reduction
9 PEW, SUPPORT FOR CUTTING SPENDING, supra note 96, at 11.
98 PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INTL, NATIONAL JOURNAL POLL FINAL
TOPLINE RESULTS, question CC5 (2013) (reporting that among adults, support for de-
fense cuts in three polls between February 2012 and October 2013 ranged from 60% to
64%); CBS NEWS, AMERICANS' VIEWS OF WASHINGTON, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE
BUDGET DEFICIT 13 (2013) (finding 38% of adults supporting defense cuts to reduce the
deficit); PEW RESEARCH CENTER, DEEP DIVISIONS OVER DEBT REDUCTION PROPOSALS 7
(2012) (finding that 40% of adults favor defense spending cuts to reduce the national
debt); CBS NEWS, THE LOOMING FISCAL CLIFF 12 (2012) (finding 42% of adults willing
to consider defense cuts to reduce the deficit); WASHINGTON POST-ABC NEWS POLL,
question 17b (2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/post-
abcpoll 20121216.html (reporting that among adults, in three polls in 2011 and 2012,
support for cutting defense spending either to reduce the deficit or avert the fiscal cliff
ranged from 42% to 43%); CBS NEWS, LOWERING THE DEFICIT AND MAKING SACRIFICES,
question 52 (2011) (finding 52% of adults willing to consider defense cuts to reduce the
deficit); JOHN M. HANSEN, INDIVIDUALS, INSTITUTIONS, AND PUBLIC PREFERENCES OVER
PUBLIC FINANCE 515 (discussing the 1995 Pilot Study for the 1996 American National
Election Study, which found that 55.4% of respondents favored cutting national de-
fense to reduce the federal budget deficit).
9 Between 1987 and 2013, Pew found that absent any mention of deficit reduction
or other tradeoffs, support for cutting Social Security ranged from 3% to 12%. PEW,
SUPPORT FOR CUTTING SPENDING, supra note 94, at 11. Similarly, between 1997 and
2013, Pew found that support for cutting Medicare ranged from 2% to 15%. Id. at 11-
12. On the other hand, polls that ask about cutting spending specifically to achieve
deficit reduction find somewhat greater openness to Social Security and Medicare
cuts. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, OBAMA JOB APPROVAL SLIPS AS ECONOMIC PESSIMISM
RISES 20 (2013) (reporting that in five polls taken between 2011 and 2013, between 32%
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causes some respondents to think about opportunity costs, which in
turn reduces their enthusiasm for government spending.oo
An article by Eva Mueller published in 1963 provides additional
evidence of voters' neglect of opportunity costs. Mueller analyzed
the results of two surveys on government spending conducted in the
early 1960s.201 Mueller found that for five of fourteen major govern-
ment programs a majority of respondents stated that government
should increase spending.102 In a follow-up question, respondents
who stated that they preferred more spending on a particular pro-
gram were asked if they would favor a spending increase even if it
resulted in the government raising taxes. Consistent with the oppor-
tunity cost neglect hypothesis, mentioning the possibility of a tax in-
crease dramatically reduced support for additional spending. In fact,
not one program was popular enough that a majority was willing to
fund additional spending on it by increasing taxes.103 Moreover,
Mueller ruled out the possibility that respondents wished to pay for
and 35% of adults state that it is more important to reduce the budget deficit than to
maintain spending on Social Security and Medicare); PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH
ASSOCIATES INT'L, NATIONAL JOURNAL POLL FINAL TOPLINE RESULTS, question CC5
(2013) (reporting that among adults, support for Social Security cuts in three polls in
2012 and 2013 ranged from 21% to 22% and support for Medicare cuts ranged from
18% to 20%); CBS NEWS, AMERICANS' VIEWS OF WASHINGTON, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE
BUDGET DEFICIT 13 (2013) (finding 18% of adults supporting cuts to Social Security and
Medicare to reduce the deficit); MCCLATCHY-MARIST NAT'L POLL (2012) (finding that
among registered voters, 23% support cutting Medicare).
1oo Although opportunity cost neglect probably explains the discrepancy between
polls that ask about deficit reduction and polls that do not, other explanations are also
possible. Perhaps people refuse to support spending cuts when responding to polls
like the Pew poll because they do not know what the government will do with the
money saved. Polls that specify that the government will use the money for deficit
reduction eliminate this uncertainty, which might account for the change in responses.
101 Eva Mueller, Public Attitudes Toward Fiscal Programs, 77 Q.J. ECON. 210, 213
(1963).
102 Id. at 215.
103 Id.
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additional spending on their preferred programs by cutting other
programs. This explanation was not consistent with the fact that re-
spondents expressed very little support for cutting any program
other than foreign aid.104 When they were not prompted to think
about tax increases, a majority of respondents (and in most cases a
large majority) favored either maintaining or increasing spending on
every other program.105
Opportunity cost neglect helps explain persistent government
budget deficits. Voters strongly support particular spending pro-
grams and are generally unwilling to entertain the possibility of cut-
ting those programs. But for many spending programs, public sup-
port is due largely to the public's failure to consider the sacrifices re-
quired to make the programs possible. Consistent with Mueller's
findings, modern-day polls find broad-based support for virtually
every spending program, but they also find that very few people sup-
port the substantial tax increases necessary to fund those programs
without running a large deficit.106 Strong demand for government
spending accompanied by little willingness to pay for it results in
chronic deficits. 107
10 Id. at 222-23.
105 Id. at 215. In fact, over 60% of respondents wished to cut spending on only one
or fewer programs, and nearly 80% wished to cut spending on only two or fewer pro-
grams. Id. at 214.
106 E.g., PEw RESEARCH CENTER, IF No DEAL IS STRUCK, FOUR-IN-TEN SAY LET THE
SEQUESTER HAPPEN 3 (2013) (finding that only 19% of adults believe that deficit reduc-
tion proposals should focus only or mostly on increased taxes); see also Huddy et al.,
supra note 15, at 448 (noting that opinion poll data show strong support for maintain-
ing or increasing Social Security and Medicare benefits, but little support for increased
taxes to pay for them).
107 My conclusion rests on the assumption that the public fails to fully appreciate
that deficit financing implies future tax increases. In other words, in its decision mak-
ing, the public weighs current taxes more heavily than equivalent future taxes neces-
sitated by public debt. For reviews of the empirical evidence on this point, see David
Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political
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A recent study by Siona Listokin and her colleagues provides
further evidence that highlighting the sacrifices required by govern-
ment spending substantially reduces support for it. Listokin con-
ducted a survey in which she asked participants how they would re-
duce the federal government's projected budget deficit by $900 bil-
lion (or about two-thirds of the projected deficit) in 2022.108 Over 60%
of the participants endorsed substantial reductions in military spend-
ing and non-defense spending, including spending on law enforce-
ment and disaster relief.109 This result differs starkly from the opin-
ion research presented above, which generally shows little support
for spending cuts of any kind.
More importantly, Listokin found that after failing to reach their
deficit-reduction target, many respondents that initially rejected pro-
posed spending cuts reconsidered and accepted them.110 Listokin
also found that people favor reducing the deficit through a combina-
tion of tax increases and spending cuts. This suggests that when
tradeoffs are clear, people do not simply conclude that the govern-
ment should reduce the deficit solely through tax increases while
leaving spending intact. Taken together, Listokin's findings provide
compelling evidence that people do not consider the opportunity
costs of government spending unless the decision frame prompts
them to do so. Moreover, when forced to consider tradeoffs, people
Salience, 65 TAx L. REV. 19,43-45 (2011) and Brian Dollery & Andrew Worthington, The
Empirical Analysis of Fiscal Illusion, 10 J. EcON. SURVEYS 261, 290-93 (1996).
108 Siona Listokin et al., Americans' Preferencesfor Tax Increases and Spending Cuts, 139
TAX NoTEs 188, 188 (2013).
'
0 Id. at 190. Listokin did not find strong support for reducing Social Security and
Medicare benefits. Id. That said, the percentage of Listokin's respondents willing to
make Medicare cuts (34%) is still higher than in most surveys that do not force partic-
ipants to seriously consider tradeoffs.
110 Id. at 191-92.
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become willing to cut government programs that according to con-
ventional wisdom, are politically untouchable.
While Listokin's study provides evidence that views about gov-
ernment spending change dramatically when tradeoffs are explicit,
the survey could be criticized on the grounds that it requires partici-
pants to achieve a goal (significant deficit reduction) with which
most voters may disagree. In other words, if required to cut the def-
icit, perhaps many voters would favor large spending cuts. But what
if voters do not want to cut the deficit? In that case, voters might
approve of the current state of affairs, which involves substantial
spending, low taxes, and large deficits.
There are three problems with this criticism. First, an over-
whelming majority of the public claims that the deficit is a problem
that needs to be addressed."' Second, as already noted, a number of
other polls also find majority support for cutting defense spending
to reduce the deficit, and unlike Listokin's survey, these other polls
do not require that respondents accept deficit reduction as a goal. Fi-
nally, even if the public favored it, indefinitely maintaining large and
growing deficits is unsustainable.112 While some economists favor
brief periods of deficit spending to lift the economy out of a recession,
chronic, large deficits can have devastating effects.113 The Congres-
sional Budget Office projects that absent significant spending reduc-
tions or tax increases, the federal budget deficit will swell in coming
M' E.g., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Focus MOSTLY ON SPENDING BUT KEEPING TAXES IN
THE Mix 29 (2013) (finding that 70% of adults believe that it is essential for the Presi-
dent and Congress to pass major deficit reduction legislation in the near future) [here-
inafter PEW, FOCUS MOSTLY ON SPENDING].
112 E.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2013 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 6-
10 (2013) ("CBO's analysis shows that under a wide range of possible assumptions
about some key factors that influence federal spending and revenues, the budget is on
an unsustainable path.").
113 For a nontechnical discussion of the harmful effects of budget deficits, see id. at
4,12-16.
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years because of higher interest payments on government debt and
increased spending on Social Security and health care.114 Given this,
Listokin's survey is useful. It suggests that when the public is forced
to consider realistic options, it chooses a balanced approach to deficit
reduction that includes substantial spending cuts as well as tax in-
creases.
The opportunity cost neglect hypothesis finds additional support
in a well-known paradox of public opinion. Pollsters often ask
whether the government should cut spending. When the question is
worded generally and without reference to specific programs, a large
majority responds that it should.115 Similarly, people believe that the
government wastes vast sums of money.1 6 Yet as we have seen,
when asked about specific programs, large majorities, including
most Republicans, favor maintaining or increasing spending on vir-
tually every one.
Part of the explanation for this phenomenon is that opportunity
cost neglect influences the public's responses to questions about spe-
cific government programs. Recall that when people are presented
114 Id. at 2-30, 81-89.
115 For a recent example, see PEW, Focus MOSTLY ON SPENDING, supra note 111, at 3
(finding that 73% of adults believe that deficit reduction should focus only or mostly
on spending cuts rather than tax increases). For a more detailed discussion of the pub-
lic opinion paradox mentioned in the text, see generally William Jacoby, Issue Framing
and Public Opinion on Government Spending, 44 AM. J. POL. Sci. 750 (2000).
116 E.g., ANDERSON ROBBINS RESEARCH & SHAW & Co. RESEARCH, Fox NEWS POLL,
Question 21 (2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/interactive/2013/01/18/fox
-news-poll-government-spending/ (finding that 49% of registered voters believe that
we could eliminate most of the national debt by cutting waste and fraud from govern-
ment and only 42% believe that significant debt reduction requires painful choices
about taxes and spending); YouGov, HUFFINGTON POST POLL (2013), http://big.as-
sets.huffingtonpost.com/wastetoplinesb.pdf (finding that 69% of adults believe that
we could eliminate most of the national debt by cutting waste and fraud from govern-
ment and only 22% believe that significant debt reduction requires painful choices
about taxes and spending).
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with a predominantly positive option, they become more likely to
pursue it in the absence of cues that prompt consideration of oppor-
tunity costs. People perceive most government programs in a posi-
tive light, which explains their continued existence. In fact, many
government programs have names (such as "veterans' benefits," "So-
cial Security," and "national defense") that are likely to trigger a pos-
itive emotional response for most people. So when they consider
whether the government should reduce spending on particular pro-
grams, people naturally forget the possibility of government waste
or that the money in question might have better uses. In the abstract
and without reference to tradeoffs, why would anyone oppose
spending on "education" or "food and drug inspection?" On the
other hand, generic questions about "government spending" do not
provoke the same positive emotional response, which explains pop-
ular support for generic spending cuts.
Opportunity cost neglect also helps explain a different, but simi-
larly perplexing finding of public opinion research. In response to
its question about government spending, the Pew Research Center
consistently finds that more than 85% of the public opposes spending
cuts to Social Security and Medicare. When pollsters mention deficit
reduction as the reason for cutting these two programs, support for
cuts increases but only by a small amount."7 Yet polls also find sub-
stantial support for specific types of Social Security and Medicare
cuts, e.g., reducing benefits for high income recipients or delaying
the retirement age.118 So the polls suggest that people are taking po-
117 See supra note 99.
I'8 E.g., SELZER & CO., BLOOMBERG NEWS NATIONAL POLL 3 (2012) (finding that in
order to reduce the deficit, a majority of adults favor reducing Social Security and
Medicare benefits for high-income earners, 42% favor increasing the eligibility age for
Medicare to 67, and 36% favor increasing the retirement age for Social Security to 69);
CBS NEWS, LOWERING THE DEFICIT AND MAKING SACRIFICES, Questions 56 and 57
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sitions that are logically inconsistent. How can the public favor spe-
cific cuts to Social Security and Medicare but also oppose cuts in gen-
eral? One possibility is that poll questions that suggest specific cuts
cause people to think about ways in which the government is wast-
ing money better used elsewhere. It is easy to imagine better uses for
tax dollars than providing pension and health care benefits to
wealthy retirees.
The final piece of evidence that voters neglect the opportunity
cost of government spending is found in research on the valuation of
environmental goods (e.g., clean air, pristine wilderness, and preser-
vation of animal species). When people state how much they are
willing to pay to preserve and protect the environment, they often
give unrealistically high amounts that would constitute a large part
of their income." 9 Because most people find environmental goods
appealing, judging a particular good in isolation without reference to
alternatives leads to exaggerated valuations.120 Consistent with the
opportunity cost neglect hypothesis, when researchers make compet-
ing alternatives salient, people generally moderate their valuations
of the focal environmental good.121
In sum, public opinion research suggests that when thinking
about government spending programs, voters tend to ignore oppor-
tunity costs because those costs are implicit. Many voters consider
(2011) (finding that in order to reduce the federal budget deficit, 63% of adults are
willing to reduce Social Security benefits for high-income retirees and 43% are willing
to raise the Social Security retirement age).
119 Peter Diamond & Jerry Hausman, On Contingent Values: Measurement of Nonuse
Values, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 3,18-19 (Jerry Hausman
ed., 1993).
120 Sanbonmatsu, supra note 54, at 209.
121 David Schkade & J. Payne, Where Do the Numbers Come from? How People Respond
to CV Questions, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 273,287-88 (Jerry
Hausman ed., 1993).
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opportunity costs only when pollsters and researchers construct
questions in a way that prompts them to do so. Unfortunately, sim-
ilar prompts do not exist in the voting booth. So opportunity cost
neglect will influence the votes that people cast. In particular, oppor-
tunity cost neglect biases voters in favor of government spending,
and they will demand more of it than they would if they considered
the implicit tradeoffs involved.
Misallocation of Government Funds
In addition to increasing the overall demand for government
spending, opportunity cost neglect may result in the misallocation of
any given level of government funds. For example, the opportunity
cost of military spending could be forgone private goods, or it could
instead be forgone public goods. Imagine what the results would be
for a poll question worded as follows: "Ten F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
jets cost about the same amount to build as 49 elementary schools or
18 high schools. Should the federal government cancel an existing
order for ten F-35 Fighters and give the money saved to state and
local governments to build elementary and high schools?"122 Based
on the existing evidence of opportunity cost neglect, it seems likely
122 The Pentagon estimates that an F-35 Fighter purchased in 2019 (when the planes
are scheduled for full-rate production) will cost $71.5 million, measured in 2012 dol-
lars. This cost estimate does not include associated development and military con-
struction costs. Andrea Shalal-Esa, Pentagon Says F-35 Fighter Delayed, Costs Rise 4.3
Percent, CHI. TRIBUNE, March 29, 2012, http:// articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-03-
29/news/sns-rt-us-lockheed-fighterbre82t03r-20120329_1_f-35-costs-rise-pentagon-
report. In 2012, the national median cost of a new high school was $38,200,000, and
the median cost of a new elementary school was $14,488,337. PAUL ABRAMSON, 2013
ANNUAL SCHOOL CONSrRUCTION REPORT 7 (2013), http://www.pe-
terli.com/spm/pdfs/SchoolConstructionReport20l3.pdf.
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that this type of question would measure substantially less enthusi-
asm for military spending than more generically worded questions
that fail to mention tradeoffs.123
Siona Listokin's survey results suggest that opportunity cost ne-
glect does in fact cause misallocation of government funds. Recall
that Listokin gave her participants the task of reducing the federal
government's projected 2022 budget deficit by $900 billion. Initially,
many of her participants passed on various proposals to reduce the
deficit. But when they failed to meet their target, they had to recon-
sider and make hard choices. Many participants who had originally
declined ultimately endorsed proposals such as cutting defense
spending. Yet, even after reconsideration, very few people were will-
ing to cut Social Security and Medicare. 124 This suggests that when
the decision frame makes tradeoffs explicit, voters will abandon sup-
port for the military and certain other programs in order to protect
Social Security and Medicare. Unfortunately, unlike Listokin's par-
ticipants, real-world voters do not have to grapple seriously with op-
portunity costs. So they continue to support spending on a number
of activities, including military spending, without realizing that do-
ing so jeopardizes the programs that they truly cherish.
123 The detailed question discussed in the text would provide many respondents
with information that they did not previously possess, and this new information might
cause some to change their responses. But absent irrationality, this fact alone would
not change responses in the aggregate. Without detailed cost information, rational re-
spondents would have to guess as to costs. Some would overestimate the cost of the
F-35 Fighter relative to school construction and some would underestimate it. But on
net, the estimates would not be biased.
124 Listokin et al., supra note 108, at 191.
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Opportunity Cost Neglect versus Rational Ignorance
Proponents of the rational actor model might dispute my claim
that opportunity cost neglect among voters is a failure of rationality.
They might insist instead that because a single vote rarely decides an
election, voters recognize that thinking about the opportunity costs
of government spending is pointless. In other words, what I refer to
as opportunity cost neglect is simply a manifestation of rational ig-
norance.
This view is mistaken. Opportunity cost neglect differs from ra-
tional ignorance because the former results in systematic bias
whereas the latter does not. Rationally ignorant voters might refuse
to think about the opportunity costs of government programs, but
that would not bias them in favor of more spending. On the contrary,
these voters would either remain agnostic or else they would guess
randomly as to whether current spending is too high or too low. Any
random guesses would not be biased in a particular direction.
Opportunity cost neglect on the other hand involves systematic
bias. All government programs entail tradeoffs. But because these
tradeoffs are implicit, voters tend to ignore them. This causes gov-
ernment programs to appear more desirable than they otherwise
would.
A recent study by Martin Baekgaard and his colleagues provides
evidence against the rational ignorance hypothesis and in favor of
systematic bias resulting from opportunity cost neglect. 125
Baekgaard conducted an experiment in Denmark that measured sup-
port for a proposed government program familiar to the Danish pub-
lic. 126 In particular, Baekgaard asked his participants whether they
125 l thank the authors for giving me permission to cite their unpublished working
paper. Please note that all of the findings presented in the text are preliminary.
126 Martin Baekgaard et al., Causes of Fiscal Illusion: Lack of Information or Lack of
Attention 13-14 (unpublished manuscript 2013).
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would support a proposal for the municipal elderly care to offer an
extra bath each week to the senior citizens that it services. Baekgaard
randomly divided his participants into groups. The question posed
to Group I did not refer at all to the program's cost. The question
posed to Group II mentioned that the program would have a cost,
but did not give a specific amount.
Baekgaard found a higher level of support for the proposal
among participants in Group I, the group that was not prompted to
consider cost.127 Even though the fact that the program would have
a cost should have been obvious to all participants, merely mention-
ing cost without specifying the amount was enough to reduce sup-
port among participants in Group 11.128
Although opportunity cost neglect was not the focus of
Baekgaard's study, the study's results provide support for the phe-
nomenon. None of the participants in either group received any spe-
cific information about costs, so all of the participants had access to
the same information. As a result, participants in Group I had no
reason to be more supportive of the proposal than participants in
Group II. Yet they were. Opportunity cost neglect explains why.
Presented with an otherwise positive proposal that did not mention
tradeoffs, the participants in Group I failed to consider the program's
opportunity costs. Simply mentioning that the program would have
a cost, though this should have been obvious to any rational ob-
server, was apparently enough to cause at least some of the partici-
pants in Group II to think about alternative uses for the government's
money. In other words, by failing to prompt consideration of
tradeoffs, the decision frame presented to Group I biased participants
127 Id. at 14-16.
128 Id.
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in favor of the proposal. This bias would not have existed if the par-
ticipants were rational. Even without prompting, rational partici-
pants would have recognized that the program would have a cost.
Of course, they would have had to guess as to exactly what the cost
might be. But guessing about unknown costs is rational; completely
ignoring them is not.
B. Tax Expenditures
Assume that the government wants to redistribute income or to
use subsidies to influence the allocation of resources in the economy.
It can accomplish these tasks by raising taxes and increasing spend-
ing. Alternatively, it can create tax preferences (i.e., special income
exclusions, deductions, or credits) that are available only to certain
categories of taxpayers (e.g., low-income taxpayers) or to taxpayers
engaged in particular activities (e.g., drilling for oil). Using tax pref-
erences to reduce a person's tax bill has the same effect as giving that
person cash raised by imposing taxes on other people. So tax policy
scholars refer to tax preferences as tax expenditures. And they rec-
ognize that tax expenditures have to be paid for either through
higher tax rates, deficit spending, or cuts to direct spending pro-
grams.
Because tax expenditures are similar to government spending,
opportunity cost neglect will lead to more tax expenditures for the
same reasons that it leads to more spending. Siona Listokin's survey
provides support for this conclusion. Initially, a majority of Lis-
tokin's participants rejected eliminating the federal income tax de-
ductions for state and local taxes and home mortgage interest as a
way to cut the budget deficit.129 But after failing to achieve their def-
icit reduction goal, many of Listokin's participants changed their po-
sition. Ultimately, Listokin found majority support for eliminating
129 Listokin et al., supra note 108, at 190-92.
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both deductions. When faced with a tight budget constraint, Lis-
tokin's participants abandoned two of the most popular tax expend-
itures to preserve funding for Social Security and Medicare, which
they apparently valued more.
Moreover, tax expenditures may result in even greater oppor-
tunity cost neglect than do comparable direct spending programs.
The reason is that the opportunity costs of tax expenditures are less
salient than those of direct spending programs. 130 This largely ex-
plains why tax expenditures are so popular.131
If tax expenditures make opportunity costs even less salient than
does direct spending, then increasing the salience of the opportunity
costs involved should reduce support for tax expenditures even more
dramatically than for similar direct spending. A recent working pa-
per by Jake Haselswerdt and Brandon Bartels provides support for
13 Cf., Faricy & Ellis, supra note 96, at 57 (noting that "many policy scholars are
concerned about the relative lack of visibility and transparency of tax expenditure pro-
grams, and the resultant effects on how the public views such programs"); Gamage &
Shanske, supra note 107, at 51-53 (reviewing evidence that tax expenditures are less
"politically salient" than similar direct spending).
131 Christopher Faricy and Christopher Ellis present experimental evidence show-
ing that "support for social spending programs is generally higher when programs are
presented as tax expenditures than when the exact same programs are presented as
direct spending." Faricy & Ellis, supra note 96, at 71. Faricy and Ellis suggest that this
is because the public, particularly Republicans, do not consider tax expenditures to be
government programs in the same way as programs financed through direct expend-
itures. But opportunity cost neglect might also underlie this finding.
Note, however, that Faricy and Ellis included a cost estimate in the descriptions of
the specific tax expenditures and spending programs that they presented to their sub-
jects. The Haselswerdt-Bartels study discussed in the text suggests that this explicit
reference to cost likely muted the effects of opportunity cost neglect on subjects' sup-
port for tax expenditures, which the subjects might otherwise have viewed as costless.
In other words, Faricy's and Ellis's results might have shown an even larger disparity
between support for tax expenditures and for similar direct spending programs if the
researchers had not prompted their subjects to think about the cost of tax expenditures.
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this hypothesis.1 32 Haselswerdt and Bartels presented study partici-
pants with two scenarios.133 In one scenario, the government helped
people afford homes by allowing them to deduct home mortgage in-
terest for tax purposes. In the other scenario, the government instead
made cash payments to individuals who borrowed money to buy a
home. Haselswerdt and Bartels informed some participants that the
housing subsidy (whether mortgage interest deduction or cash
grant) would add $390 billion to the national debt over the next four
years. Other participants did not receive any cost information. Ha-
selswerdt and Bartels found that the reference to the national debt
reduced support for the home mortgage interest deduction even
more than it reduced support for the comparable direct spending
program.134
The likely explanation for this finding is that in the absence of
cues to consider opportunity costs, many participants failed to do so.
Referring to the subsidy's effect on the national debt triggered par-
ticipants to think about opportunity costs, which reduced support for
the proposal no matter what its form. But the effect was more dra-
matic for the home mortgage interest deduction because in the ab-
sence of cues, participants were more likely to ignore the opportunity
cost of the deduction than of the cash grant. After all, it should be
obvious to at least some people that cash grants would either add to
the national debt or necessitate tax increases, and this alone might be
sufficient to cause them to spontaneously consider alternative uses
for the money.
132 Jake Haselswerdt & Brandon Bartels, Public Opinion, Policy Tools, and Policy
Feedbacks (July 11, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). I thank the
authors for giving me permission to cite to an unpublished draft of their paper. Please
note that the findings discussed in the text are preliminary.
133 Id. at 10-11.
134 Id. at 13-14, 18-22.
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C. Regulation
Some economists criticize certain regulations as ineffective, ex-
cessively costly, and inimical to economic growth. 35 But public
opinion research finds that overwhelming majorities of the public
support either increasing or maintaining the current level of regula-
tion in many areas, including automobile safety, food and drug
safety, cable television access and cost, and health care. 136
In light of opportunity cost neglect, these findings are not sur-
prising. Opportunity cost neglect will increase the demand for gov-
ernment regulation. As with tax expenditures, the salience of the op-
portunity costs of regulation is likely even lower than that for direct
spending programs. At least some voters will recognize that govern-
ment spending involves monetary outlays that the government must
pay for through tax increases, additional borrowing, or cuts to other
programs. This may lead those voters to consider opportunity costs.
Government regulations on the other hand do not entail monetary
outlays at least not on the part of the government. The outlays (if
any) required to comply with regulations are made by regulated par-
ties, who may be able to pass these costs on to consumers or others
with whom they deal. This fact is unlikely to be obvious to voters
135 E.g., CLIFFORD WINSTON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET FAILURE (2006);
Simeon Djankov et al., 117 The Regulation of Entry, Q.J. ECON. 1, 35 (2002) ("We find
that heavier regulation of [business] entry is generally associated with greater corrup-
tion and a larger unofficial economy, but not with better quality of private and public
goods.... Entry is regulated more heavily by less democratic governments [and the]
principal beneficiaries appear to be the politicians and bureaucrats themselves.").
16 Tasic, Growth of Government, supra note 6, at 553; NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO,
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, & HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT POLL,
supra note 96, at 23. As with public spending, people often oppose regulation in the
abstract and answer yes to generic questions such as, "Does the government regulate
business too much?". Yet the public favors particular types of regulation. CAPLAN,
supra note 6, at 62-63.
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who are considering in the abstract whether to support a particular
regulation. Moreover, in some cases (e.g., bans on certain products),
no monetary outlay occurs. So not only is the exact dollar cost of
regulations difficult to determine, but the fact that regulations in-
volve any cost at all remains implicit. These circumstances suggest
the possibility for extreme opportunity cost neglect.137
Opportunity cost neglect helps explain why, despite the protes-
tations of economists, the public is much more enthusiastic about ad-
dressing global warming through command-and-control regulations
rather than a carbon tax. Command-and-control regulations, such as
rules requiring car companies to produce more fuel-efficient cars,
137 Richard Posner argues that regulation sometimes operates as a form of taxation.
Richard Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22 (1971). The
government often mandates that a regulated firm provide a service to certain custom-
ers at below cost, and the firm generally makes up for the resulting loss by charging
its other customers a higher price than they would otherwise pay. Id. at 29. The re-
sulting "internal subsidization" can "be viewed as an exertion of state power whose
purpose, like that of other taxes, is to compel members of the public to support a ser-
vice that the market would provide at a reduced level, or not at all." Id. Posner points
out that "[a] troubling characteristic of the internal subsidy is its low visibility, which
impedes responsible review. The amounts and recipients of direct subsidies are ordi-
narily specifically stated, but this is not the case with internal subsidies." Id. at 43; cf
Gamage & Shanske, supra note 107, at 51-53 ("[Vioters may not appreciate the burdens
imposed by regulation to the same degree as they would the burdens imposed by
taxes, such that using regulation as a substitute for tax-financed spending may have
less political salience.").
Similarly, Richard Epstein argues against redistribution via government-mandated
benefits such as a requirement that employers provide health insurance to their em-
ployees or that landlords supply apartments at below-market rents. EPSTEIN, supra
note 20, at 145-46. Epstein claims that this "technique of off-budget financing" under-
mines democratic accountability. EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 145-46. Epstein argues
instead that if the government provides these benefits at all, it should finance them out
of general tax revenues. EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 145-46. According to Epstein,
"When the expenditures are made explicit through the budget process, the public is
better able to make an informed choice about the costs and benefits of the program."
EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at at 146.
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have a significant drawback. 138 Specifically, regulations dictate
which polluters must reduce carbon emissions and exactly how they
must do so. Unfortunately, the polluters that the government targets
may not be the ones that can abate emissions at the lowest cost. Sim-
ilarly, the methods of abatement that the government selects may not
be the least expensive available. A carbon tax would solve this prob-
lem by placing a price on carbon emissions. Polluters who find it less
expensive to reduce emissions than to pay the tax would do so. Oth-
ers would simply pay the tax. So pollution abatement is allocated to
those polluters who find it cheapest. Additionally, the tax would
provide polluters with an incentive to find cheaper ways to avoid
emissions. In theory, the government could achieve the same level
of emissions reduction with a carbon tax as with regulations but at a
much lower social cost.
Despite this compelling logic, polls show that the public strongly
supports global warming regulations and strongly opposes a carbon
tax. 139 While a number of explanations are possible, opportunity cost
138 For a textbook discussion of the advantages of emissions fees, including carbon
taxes, over command-and-control regulations, see HARVEY ROSEN & TED GAYER,
PUBLIC FINANCE 86-88, 94-96 (8th ed., 2008).
1" FREDERICK MAYER ET AL., AMERICANS THINK THE CLIMATE IS CHANGING AND
SUPPORT SOME ACTIONs 2-4 (2013), available at http:// nicholasinsti-
tute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni pb_13-01_0.pdf (finding that only
29% of adults strongly or somewhat favored a carbon tax, while over 60% strongly or
somewhat favored regulations on power plants and factories and requiring car man-
ufacturers to produce more fuel-efficient cars); Matthew Nisbet & Teresa Myers,
Twenty Years of Public Opinion about Global Warming, 71 PUB. OPINION Q. 444, 460-68
(2007) (summarizing poll results that generally show strong support for government
regulation in response to global warming, but much less support for taxes on electric-
ity and gasoline); Anthony Leiserowitz, Climate Change Risk Perception and Policy Pref-
erences: The Role of Affect, Imagery, and Values, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 45, 55-56 (2006)
(finding strong support among Americans for carbon regulation, including increasing
vehicle fuel economy standards, but finding strong opposition to reducing greenhouse
gases through a gas tax or business energy tax).
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neglect is very likely a major factor. For at least some voters, the
words "carbon tax" probably bring to mind opportunity costs. After
all, taxes entail sacrifice. On the other hand, the sacrifices, including
price increases, that result from regulations imposed on power
plants, factories, and car manufacturers are not as obvious.
In addition, opportunity cost neglect helps explain the perverse
incentives faced by the Food and Drug Administration when it is ap-
proving new drugs for use in the United States. The FDA can make
two types of errors in approving new drugs.140 A Type I error occurs
when the FDA approves a drug that is in fact unsafe. A Type II error
occurs when the FDA does not approve a drug that is safe. A number
of studies find that the FDA focuses too heavily on Type I errors.141
In other words, it sometimes fails to approve drugs that are safe be-
cause of its excessive concern about approving drugs that are not
safe.
The conventional explanation for the FDA's focus on Type I er-
rors is risk aversion.142 Agency bureaucrats know that the media, the
public, and Congress will pay attention if an approved drug turns
out to have unexpected side effects because those effects will be
highly visible. 43 On the other hand, the public will generally defer
to the FDA's judgment if it labels a drug as unsafe, and any Type II
140 Brief for Economists John Calfee et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at
7, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695 (2007) (No. 04-5350); RICHARD EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: How EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT
REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 116 (2006).
141 For a review of the literature, see Brief for Economists John Calfee et al., supra
note 140, at 10-12.
142 Brief for Economists John Calfee et al., supra note 140, at 7-8; EPSTEIN, supra note
140, at 116-17.
143 Brief for Economists John Calfee et al., supra note 140, at 9-10; EPSTEIN, supra note
140, at 116-17.
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errors may go largely unnoticed.144 To avoid negative publicity, FDA
bureaucrats rationally decide to err on the side of caution.
This begs the question: Why do Type I errors capture the public's
attention more than Type II errors? Opportunity cost neglect pro-
vides the explanation. The cost of not approving a safe drug is for-
going treatment of sick patients. This cost is implicit and not imme-
diately obvious even to doctors and to patients who would otherwise
benefit from the drug. But the costs of approving an unsafe drug
include terrible side effects that no one can ignore.145 These latter
costs are more likely to draw attention from the media and the public.
For additional evidence of opportunity cost neglect with respect
to government regulation, consider the finding by Nancy Kraus and
her colleagues that over 60% of the public thinks that it can never be
too expensive to reduce risks related to chemicals. 146 Requiring
chemical companies to completely eliminate the risks of chemical ex-
posure would involve enormous sacrifices. Not surprisingly, an
overwhelming majority of toxicologists disagrees with the public on
the issue.147 Kraus's finding implies that many people simply fail to
consider the tradeoffs that regulation requires. 148 Eliminating the
risks of chemical exposure sounds like a great idea until you consider
the opportunity costs. But because those costs are implicit, Kraus's
survey participants failed to do that.
144 Brief for Economists John Calfee et al., supra note 140, at 9-10.
145 EPSTEIN, supra note 140, at 116-17.
' Nancy Kraus et al., Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of Chemical Risk,
12 RISK ANALYSIS 215, 220-21 (1992).
147 Id. at 221.
148 In addition to opportunity cost neglect, the discrepancy between the public's
views on chemical risk reduction and those of toxicologists stems from a difference in
opinion about whether exposure to small amounts of potentially harmful chemicals
can be safe. The public tends to think not, but toxicologists disagree. Id. at 217-20.
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More generally, researchers have found strong evidence that
cognitive and emotional biases exert significant influence over gov-
ernment regulation of risk. For example, several studies have found
that people are sometimes willing to pay a premium to eliminate a
certain risk even though the money could be better spent reducing,
but not eliminating, some other risk.149 Similarly, James Hamilton
and W. Kip Viscusi found evidence that irrationality influences
clean-up decisions by the Environmental Protection Agency related
to hazardous waste sites. 150 As a result, the cost per cancer case
averted varies dramatically from one contaminated site to another.151
When irrationality affects risk regulation, opportunity cost neglect
plays a role. Neglecting opportunity costs allows us as a society to
indulge our irrational tendencies by blinding us to the required
tradeoffs.
D. Note on Public Opinion Polls
Politicians and pundits frequently rely upon public opinion polls
to determine what policies voters support.152 But if the goal is to dis-
cern the policies that voters would prefer if they were rational, then
most existing polls are highly misleading. They fail to elicit consid-
eration of opportunity costs, which is crucial to rational decision
making.
As an example of how polls can mislead, consider the Pew Re-
search Center's polls on government spending discussed in subpart
149 Ilana Ritov et al., Franing Effects in the Evaluation of Multiple Risk Reduction, 6 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 145 (1993); W. Kip Viscusi et al., An Investigation of the Rationality
of Consumer Valuations of Multiple Health Risks, 18 RAND J. ECON. 465 (1987).
15 JAMES HAMILTON & W. Kip ViscusI, CALCULATING RISKS? THE SPATIAL AND
POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY 139-55 (1999).
151 Id. at 148-50.
152 For a discussion of the influence of public opinion on government policy, see
infra Part IV.B.
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A of this Part. Those polls consistently show that voters support
maintaining or increasing spending on virtually all government pro-
grams. Pundits sometimes argue that polls like the Pew polls prove
that Americans like government. The problem is that Pew's ques-
tions on government spending do not force people to come to grips
with the sacrifices that government programs require. Polls are more
likely to be reliable when they ask explicitly about tradeoffs.153
Many pollsters seem to understand this point, and they have re-
sponded by modifying their polls. Specifically, the most popular
method of eliciting consideration of tradeoffs is to ask a series of
questions about whether the government should cut spending on
particular programs to reduce the budget deficit. Although an im-
provement over the Pew polls, this technique is still not sufficient to
produce careful consideration of opportunity costs. Many people
mistakenly believe that the government can substantially reduce its
budget deficit without difficult choices simply by eliminating waste-
ful expenditures.154 So when a poll subject responds that govern-
ment should not cut spending on a particular program to reduce the
deficit, she may take that position only because of unrealistic views
about deficit reduction.
To overcome this problem, pollsters must devise techniques that
force participants to grapple seriously with the tradeoffs that govern-
ment programs necessitate. Siona Listokin's survey illustrates how
this can be accomplished. Listokin's participants had to make tough
choices to eliminate $900 billion from the federal government's pro-
jected budget deficit in 2022. Based on Pew's polls, we might expect
153 See John Hansen, Individuals, Institutions, and Public Preferences over Public Fi-
nance, 92 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 513, 519 (1998) (arguing that polls that ask about tradeoffs
"elicit more circumspect opinions on budgetary alternatives" because they "cause re-
spondents to stop and think, at least momentarily").
154 See supra note 116.
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that Listokin's participants would oppose any significant spending
cuts and opt instead to raise taxes. On the contrary, Listokin found
that imposing a tight budget constraint substantially reduced sup-
port for many types of government spending as well as popular tax
expenditures. Listokin forced her participants to take seriously a
goal (deficit reduction) that an overwhelming majority of Americans
claims to support. As a result, her findings arguably reflect more
accurately than most other polls voters' true preferences for govern-
ment spending.
That said, I recognize that most politicians do not read polls to
discover the policies that rational voters would support. After all,
part of the point of this Article is that because of opportunity cost
neglect, real-world voters will mistakenly vote against politicians
who support those policies. Since politicians care primarily about
getting elected, they will find the Pew polls on government spending
more helpful than the Listokin study. Yet this fact itself demonstrates
that our democracy functions poorly.
IV. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS
Part III analyzed the effects of opportunity cost neglect on voters'
policy preferences. Voters may also suffer from other failures of ra-
tionality that aggravate or mitigate these effects. In addition, politi-
cians and bureaucrats may influence public policy by shaping or ig-
noring voters' preferences. This Part discusses the policy implica-
tions of these complicating factors.
A. Voters' Other Biases and the Use of Heuristics
Opportunity cost neglect is not the only bias to which voters are
prone. Voters suffer from other biases that influence public opinion.
In addition, voters use certain heuristics to determine their policy
preferences. This section discusses how certain biases and heuristics
interact with opportunity cost neglect to shape voters' demand for
public policy.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
[Vol. 9:249
OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND
The Intentions Heuristic
As discussed in Part I, voters tend to support policies that they
believe are in the public interest. But how do voters determine which
policies fit that description? One way would be to conduct cost-ben-
efit analyses focusing on the consequences of each proposal. Unfor-
tunately, cost-benefit analysis does not come naturally or easily. It
requires that voters become informed and consider difficult
tradeoffs, an exercise that takes time and effort. Given that a single
vote usually is not decisive, voters have no incentive to bother with
such unpleasantness. Doing so yields no personal benefit.
Under these circumstances, rationally ignorant voters would rec-
ognize that they are too uninformed to thoroughly analyze policy
proposals. They would also recognize that politicians who have
more information than they do might use their informational ad-
vantage to advance the agenda of special interest groups that provide
them with campaign contributions and other benefits. Thus, ration-
ally ignorant voters would view proposals for government interven-
tion with cautious skepticism, withholding support unless politi-
cians clearly show that intervention is necessary.155
But irrational voters do not respond in this way. Instead, irra-
tional voters often invoke the intentions heuristic and judge a policy
based on the intentions of its advocates rather than on the policy's
actual consequences. 5 6 The idea is that good results flow from good
155 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 105-06.
156 Jeffrey Friedman, Popper, Weber, and Hayek: The Epistemology and Politics of Igno-
rance, 17 CRITICAL REV. i, xix-xxi (2005); see also, Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?, supra
note 6; WINSTON, supra note 135, at 2 ("[S]ome commentators and policymakers are outright
dismissive of policy assessments based on cost-benefit analysis, apparently willing to substitute
good intentions-or their own political agenda-for analysis.").
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intentions and bad results flow from bad intentions.'5 7 While this
heuristic functions well in certain settings, it may be deceptive when
used outside the contexts in which it evolved.' Rather than admit
that they are uninformed, voters may substitute the intentions heu-
ristic for cost-benefit analysis allowing them to feel confident in the
policies they support. The intentions heuristic also allows voters to
embrace policies that make them feel good and that are consistent
with their worldview while conveniently ignoring any implicit
tradeoffs. 59 And if the intentions heuristic leads a voter astray, then
so what? The error does not cost him personally.
The effects of the intentions heuristic will be similar to those of
opportunity cost neglect. Proposals for more government spending,
tax expenditures, and regulations are generally motivated by good
intentions. If voters reflexively support these proposals based on the
motives of their proponents and without considering the sacrifices
that they require, the consequence will be greater demand for gov-
ernment in all its forms.
As an example, consider the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).' 6 0 The ADA requires that employers provide reasonable ac-
commodation to disabled employees and outlaws employment dis-
crimination against disabled persons. The ADA was motivated by a
desire to increase employment among people with disabilities. But
by requiring expensive accommodations and making it more diffi-
cult to fire the disabled, the Act unintentionally increases the cost of
157 Friedman, supra note 156, at xx.
15 Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?, supra note 6.
159 For a discussion of the related idea that voters have a quasi-religious devotion
to certain beliefs because those beliefs are consistent with their political worldview,
see CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 14-16.
160 Slavisa Tasic uses this and other examples to illustrate the intentions heuristic.
Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?, supra note 6.
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hiring them.'6 ' As a result, employment rates for disabled persons
decreased after the ADA became law. 6 2 The adoption of a well-in-
tentioned law that has unintended, adverse consequences illustrates
the intentions heuristic at work. In addition, Sam Peltzman argues
that even though there are more losers than winners under the ADA,
the public does not call for repeal because the winners (disabled per-
sons with jobs) know they are benefiting from the ADA, while the
losers (disabled persons unable to find jobs) do not know that the
ADA is the reason that they are out of work.163
The intentions heuristic and opportunity cost neglect also help
explain an important political phenomenon identified by economists.
In exchange for campaign contributions and other forms of political
support, politicians often adopt laws that benefit special interest
groups and harm the public.'6 For example, farm subsidies benefit
farmers to the detriment of consumers and taxpayers.165 Programs
like the farm program effectively transfer money from one group
(consumers or taxpayers) to another (producers or other special in-
terests).166 The puzzling aspect is that the transfers are usually struc-
tured in an inefficient way that distorts markets and creates a large
161 Sam Peltzman, Regulation and the Wealth ofNations: The Connection between Gov-
ernment Regulation and Economic Progress, 3 NEW PERSPECTIVES ON POL. ECON. 185, 192-
94 (2007).
162 Daron Acemoglu & Joshua Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The
Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 199 J. POL. ECON. 915, 948-50 (2001); Thomas
DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J.
HUMAN RESOURCES 693,711 (2000).
13 Peltzman, supra note 161, at 194.
16 GWARTNEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 123-26; GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS
OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT SEEKING 18-22 (1989).
1 DAVID BESANKO & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMIcs 387-90 (2nd ed.,
2005).
166 E.g., WINSTON, supra note 135, at 23 (" [Clommodity price support programs ba-
sically amount to transfers from consumers to producers that generate annual net wel-
fare losses of $3.0 billion to $12.4 billion.").
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deadweight loss. 67 A deadweight loss exists when the harm to con-
sumers and taxpayers outweighs the benefits to others, including
special interests. The simplest and most efficient way to structure
transfers is to impose a tax on the group targeted for harm and to
transfer the money collected directly to target recipients.'68 A direct
payment would minimize the deadweight loss, which could in turn
benefit all affected parties. But instead of direct payments, the gov-
ernment often uses indirect and inefficient means to carry out the
transfer, e.g., acreage limitations.
Why are direct payments so rare and inefficient transfers ubiqui-
tous? The traditional explanation is that direct payments are "too
raw" to be politically palatable. 69 In other words, a rationally igno-
rant public might be duped by cleverly disguised farm subsidies. But
a direct transfer from consumers or taxpayers to special interest
groups would be scandalous, particularly since many of the benefi-
ciaries of programs like the farm program are large corporations and
wealthy individuals.
While plausible, the economist Donald Wittman has criticized
this explanation by arguing that it assumes what he believes is an
unrealistic asymmetry.'o The beneficiaries of inefficient transfers
recognize them as a transfer (and therefore lobby in favor), but those
who are harmed do not. Wittman argues that even if this were the
case, then a political entrepreneur could profit by making those
harmed by inefficient transfers aware of their error.
167 BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 165, at 387-90; TULLOCK, supra note 164, at
19-22.
168 BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 165, at 387; TULLOCK, supra note 164, at 19-
22.
169 Tullock, supra note 164, at 19-24. For a review of the literature on inefficient
transfers, see Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, On the Form of Transfers to Special Inter-
ests, 103 J. POL. EcoN. 1210, 1210-12 (1995).
' WITTMAN, supra note 33, at 34.
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If we assume that voters are rational and unbiased, as Wittman
does, then his critique has merit.17 ' But if voters instead rely upon
the intentions heuristic and are prone to neglect opportunity costs,
then politicians and special interest groups will find inefficient trans-
fers useful. They can market special interest legislation to voters by
first cloaking it in public interest rhetoric. To economists, farm sub-
sidies inefficiently transfer money from consumers and taxpayers to
often wealthy farmers.172 To politicians, farm subsidies protect the
national interest by reducing food imports and ensuring "a safe and
reliable food supply that is grown at home." 73 The latter description
conveys that the subsidies are motivated by good intentions. More-
over, using inefficient transfers rather than direct payments accom-
plishes two objectives. First, it conceals the fact that the recipients
are not always impoverished farmers struggling to get by, which is
necessary so that politicians who support farm subsidies can claim to
have good intentions. Second, it makes the opportunity cost of the
transfers less salient.
And while Wittman is correct that a political entrepreneur might
attempt to bring inefficient transfers to voters' attention, the odds of
success are low. Voters have no personal incentive to investigate
whether the benefits of inefficient transfers outweigh the costs. After
all, one vote generally makes no difference. And convincing voters
171 But see Coate & Morris, supra note 169, at 1213 (arguing that "a combination of
asymmetric information about policies and politicians can explain the choice of ineffi-
cient methods of redistribution in a world in which voters are rational").
172 WINSTON, supra note 135, at 22 ("Generally, subsidies mainly go to big Agribusi-
ness corporations and the richest farmers.").
173 Boston.com, Inside Washington: Farm Subsidies Staying Power, http:// www.bos-
ton.com/business/articles/2010/11/14/inside washington farm subsidiesstay-
ing-power/ (quoting Representative Vicky Hartzler of Missouri). If, as Bryan Caplan
argues, voters suffer from antiforeign bias, then by drawing attention to the potential dangers
of relying on imported food, Representative Hartzler's statement makes farm subsidies more
appealing.
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to change their intuitive views would involve overcoming powerful
biases. In fact, if political entrepreneurs had succeeded in educating
voters about inefficient transfers, then politicians who support them
would lose nothing by discussing the transfers openly in frank
terms.' 7 4 Yet this is not what happens. If you have any remaining
doubt, consider whether politicians would loudly proclaim that farm
subsidies protect the domestic food supply if all voters were econo-
mists.' 75
Antimarket Bias
Bryan Caplan and Slavisa Tasic present evidence that voters suf-
fer from antimarket bias, which is "a tendency to underestimate the
economic benefits of the market mechanism." 176 Whereas econo-
mists generally view market exchanges as mutually beneficial to both
buyer and seller, many noneconomists think of trade as a zero-sum
game in which wealthy producers exploit consumers.m
Survey evidence shows that compared to the typical economist,
the public is very suspicious of business and of the market's ability
to produce socially beneficial outcomes. 78 Even after controlling for
income, ideology, and certain other variables, the typical nonecono-
mist is much more likely than the typical economist to believe that
tax breaks for business significantly harm the economy; that business
profits are too high; that top executives are paid too much; that in-
174 See Tullock, supra note 164, at 19-24.; cf Hirshleifer, supra note 6, at 857 ("In a
rational setting, the rhetoric of political discourse doesn't matter. I will argue instead
that the form of political discourse is crucial.").
175 In a survey of members of the American Economic Association, 85.2% favored
eliminating agricultural subsidies. See Whaples, supra note 39, at 1.
176 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 30-36; see also Tasic, Growth of Government, supra note
6, at 554-58.
17 Tasic, Growth of Government, supra note 6, at 556-67; CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 32.
17 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 50-93.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
310 [Vol. 9:249
OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND
creases in gas prices result from oil companies trying to increase prof-
its rather than from supply and demand; that the current price of gas
is too high; and that trade agreements with other countries reduce
jobs in the United States.179
Moreover, contrary to conventional wisdom, this antimarket
view is not limited to liberal Democrats. Stephen Miller analyzed
detailed empirical evidence on attitudes toward the free market and
government regulation.o80 He found that while liberals are more
likely to favor government intervention, "the differences between
conservatives and liberals are often fairly small, and ... most con-
servatives, too, are wary of free markets, bordering on being hostile
to them-especially when it comes to particulars, rather than abstrac-
tions."181 For example, 69% of conservatives believe that sharehold-
ers rather than workers receive too great a portion of profits; 65% be-
lieve that the government should control prices; 63% believe that the
government should provide jobs and give aid to growing industries;
45% believe the government should support declining industries;
44% believe that business is too powerful; and 39% agree that work-
ers and management are fundamentally at odds.182
The public's antimarket bias is in part an emotional response. As
Caplan puts it, "seeing trade as disguised exploitation soothes those
who dislike the market's outcome." 83 But suspicion of the market
has cognitive origins as well.184 Antimarket bias is a special case of
179 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 50-93.
180 Stephen Miller, Conservatives and Liberals on Economics: Expected Differences, Sur-
prising Similarities, 19 CRITICAL REv. 47 (2007).
181 Id. at 53.
182 Id. at 53-54.
18 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 119.
184 Slavisa Tasic discusses other possible sources of antimarket bias, including the
possibility that it is grounded in the way humans evolved. Tasic, Growth of Govern-
ment, supra note 6, at 554-58.
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the intentions heuristic. The public does not trust the market because
producers are selfishly motivated by the desire for profit.185 The pub-
lic believes that producers' greed leads them to take advantage of
consumers by charging exorbitant prices for low quality products.
Recognition of producers' bad intentions leads voters to demand
government intervention.
The problem with the public's conception of markets is that it
ignores the salutary effects of competition.'8 6 Competition limits the
prices that producers can charge. Moreover, a firm that fleeces its
customers will lose their business, reducing profits in the long run.
In a competitive market, firms that offer low-cost products that con-
sumers value secure higher profits than those that do the opposite.
As a result, economists recognize that self-interested actions by indi-
vidual market participants can produce substantial societal bene-
fits.187 Unfortunately, the public has not received the message. In-
stead, noneconomists often believe (erroneously) that the economy is
dominated by monopolies and that firms can raise prices whenever
business executives are feeling particularly greedy.s8 8
Overconfidence in government is another likely source of anti-
market bias. Because they do not understand the complexities of hu-
man behavior, voters are too quick to conclude that government can
improve on the performance of the market.189 The Dunning-Kruger
effect is a cognitive bias that leads people with a superficial under-
1s Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?, supra note 6; see also CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 30-
33.
186 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 30-33.
187 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 32.
188 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 34-36; WINSTON, supra note 135, at 15 (summarizing evi-
dence that the U.S. economy does not suffer "from any serious underlying anticompetitive
problems").
189 Cf Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?, supra note 6 (arguing that regulators are over-
confident in their ability to manage the economy).
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standing of a subject to overestimate their competence and underes-
timate what they do not know.190 Voters who have a superficial un-
derstanding of the economy falsely conclude that government inter-
vention can easily and simply solve perceived problems with market
outcomes. This helps explain why even after controlling for demo-
graphic characteristics, uninformed voters are more likely than in-
formed voters to oppose market solutions and to favor more govern-
ment.191 As a group, informed voters apparently have a better un-
derstanding of what even liberal economists acknowledge: The mar-
ket is complex, and government intervention often produces ad-
verse, unintended consequences.192
Voters' antimarket bias exacerbates opportunity cost neglect.
Antimarket bias makes government intervention seem more attrac-
tive. Unlike greedy firms that are trying to maximize profits, politi-
cians proposing new spending programs, tax expenditures, and reg-
ulations seemingly have the best of intentions. Many government
programs are ostensibly motivated by a desire to keep us healthy and
safe and to help the poor. Voters' tendency to neglect opportunity
190 Justin Kruger and David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in
Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY
AND Soc. PSYCH. 1121 (1999).
191 Scott Althaus finds that informed voters are more likely than uninformed voters
to support market solutions and to oppose government intervention. ScoTr ALTHAUS,
COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 111-17, 128-32 (2003) ("[Flully in-
formed opinion tends to be fiscally conservative when it comes to expanding domestic
programs, to prefer free market solutions over government intervention to solve pol-
icy problems, to be less supportive of additional governmental intervention to protect
the environment, and to prefer a smaller and less powerful federal government."). Al-
thaus also finds that informed voters tend to be more progressive on social policy top-
ics. In other words, informed voters tend to be more libertarian than uninformed vot-
ers.
192 See, e.g., JOSEPH STIGLITz, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 8-10 (3d ed., 2000).
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costs complements this view of the world by concealing the tradeoffs
that government intervention entails.
Action Bias
A rational actor focuses on decision outcomes.193 So a rational
actor will take action only if the expected consequences of doing so
are better than the expected consequences of inaction. Real people,
on the other hand, suffer from action bias, which is an irrational pen-
chant for action.194
One cause of action bias is that taking action makes it easier to
receive credit for bringing about a good outcome. Anthony Patt and
Richard Zeckhauser presented experimental subjects with one of two
scenarios. 195 In the first scenario, an environmental group had funds
either to help a town install a treatment system to clean up a polluted
river or to pay a new factory to install scrubbers that would preserve
existing air quality, which was already good.196 In the second sce-
nario, the group could use its funds to help a town install a treatment
system to protect a currently unpolluted river from an expected in-
crease in water pollution or to pay an existing factory to install scrub-
bers to clean up polluted air.197 Patt and Zeckhauser found that 68%
of subjects faced with the first scenario recommended cleaning up
the polluted river over maintaining air quality, which suggests that
the subjects cared more about clean water than clean air. But when
193 See Anthony Patt & Richard Zeckhauser, Action Bias and Environmental Decisions,
21 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 45,48 (2000).
194 Michael Bar-Eli et al., Action Bias among Elite Soccer Goal Keepers: The Case of Pen-
alty Kicks, 28 J. ECON. PSYCH. 606, 608 n.2 (2007); see also, Marcel Zeelenberg et al., The
Inaction Effect in the Psychology of Regret, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 314, 317-
24 (2002); Patt & Zeckhauser, supra note 193, at 45-47. For a discussion of action bias
and government failure, see Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?, supra note 6.
1- See Patt & Zeckhauser, supra note 193, at 55-59.
196 See Patt & Zeckhauser, supra note 193, at 56.
197 See Patt & Zeckhauser, supra note 193, at 56.
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faced with the second scenario, the subjects split evenly between
maintaining water quality and cleaning up the air, which suggests
that the subjects cared equally about the two goals.198 Patt and Zeck-
hauser reconcile these disparate findings by arguing that people are
biased in favor of taking action when they can take credit for demon-
strable gains.'99 Cleaning up dirty water or dirty air has an obvious
positive impact that is easy to visualize. Maintaining water or air
that is already clean does not. So subjects were biased in favor of
clean up rather than preservation whether the dirty resource was wa-
ter or air.
Notice also that opportunity cost neglect plays a key role in Patt
and Zeckhauser's experiment. In both scenarios, taking action to
clean up existing pollution in one area entails failing to avoid pollu-
tion in another area. Patt and Zeckhauser suggest that their subjects
discounted the latter loss because unlike cleaning up pollution, pro-
tecting the environment from degradation avoids a nondemonstra-
ble loss that is difficult to visualize.200 In other words, the fact that
the loss is indirect and implicit makes it easy to ignore.
A second cause of action bias is that in some cases, action seems
more normal than inaction.201 Therefore, if and when things turn out
badly, someone who took action to prevent the bad outcome seems
less blameworthy than someone who took no action.202 This may be
true even if the action taken actually made the bad outcome more
likely. For example, Michael Bar-Eli and his colleagues found that in
198 See Patt & Zeckhauser, supra note 193, at 58.
'9 See Patt & Zeckhauser, supra note 193, at 50-56.
200 See Patt & Zeckhauser, supra note 193, at 55, 64-65.
201 In other cases, inaction seems more normal than action, which can lead to omis-
sion bias. For a review of the literature on omission bias, see Zeelenberg et al., supra
note 194, at 314-15.
202 Bar-Eli et al., supra note 194, at 614; Zeelenberg et al., supra note 194, at 317-24.
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defending against a penalty kick, the optimal strategy for a soccer
goalkeeper is to stay in the center of the goal, a strategy that can be
viewed as inaction. 203 Yet even elite soccer goalkeepers almost al-
ways jump left or right.204 Bar-Eli's survey of elite goalkeepers found
that in defending against penalty kicks, the goalkeepers believe that
jumping left or right rather than staying in the center is normal.205
Moreover, 11 goalkeepers reported that they would feel worse if a
goal were scored while they remained in the center rather than jump-
ing, while only 4 indicated the opposite. 206 This is irrational given
that staying in the center minimizes the probability of giving up a
goal.207
Soccer penalty kicks are not the only situation in which taking
action is the norm. Following a negative outcome, people often feel
compelled to take action to improve future outcomes. 208 Doing
something rather than doing nothing is the normal response to a bad
outcome. Problems call for solutions, not inaction. So if one bad out-
come is followed by another, people are more likely to feel regret
203 Bar-Eli et al., supra note 194, at 612-13. Staying in the center is the optimal strat-
egy given the current distribution of kicks. If goalkeepers always stayed in the center,
then kickers would eventually catch on and start aiming kicks away from the center.
Goalkeepers would then need to change their strategy. Bar-Eli et al., supra note 194, at
616.
204 Bar-Eli et al., supra note 194, at 612-13.
205 Bar-Eli et al., supra note 194, at 614-15.
206 Bar-Eli et al., supra note 194, at 614. In addition, fifteen goalkeepers gave the
highest possible rating (10, "feel very bad") to all 3 possible scenarios (a goal being
scored while jumping right, jumping left, or staying in the center), which made it im-
possible to compare their reactions among the 3 situations. Two goalkeepers gave the
same rating (but less than 10) to all of the scenarios.
207 Perhaps goalkeepers are not trying to minimize the possibility of a goal, but are
instead trying to minimize the likelihood that coaches, teammates, and spectators will
blame them for giving up a goal. This begs the question: why are observers more
likely to blame a goalkeeper for staying in the center when that strategy maximizes
the chances for success? Action bias provides the answer.
208 Zeelenberg et al., supra note 194, at 317.
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about the second bad outcome if they failed to take action in response
to the first. For example, if a soccer team loses two games in a row,
experimental subjects predict that the team's coach will regret the
second loss more and feel more responsible for it if he failed to take
action in response to the first loss.209 This bias in favor of action is
problematic because even after a bad outcome, inaction may be the
best option.
Action bias and opportunity cost neglect may combine and lead
to excessive government intervention. If some crisis occurs, action
bias leads voters to demand government action despite the possibil-
ity that every possible government response may only make matters
worse. 210 During a crisis, continued commitment to the free market
seems like inaction rather than a possible solution. In addition, op-
portunity cost neglect makes potential government responses more
appealing by concealing implicit tradeoffs that may be difficult to
demonstrate or visualize. 211 Moreover, politicians are eager to sup-
ply legislation because taking action allows them to claim credit for
addressing the problem. Politically, doing nothing is a nonstarter.
Consistent with this hypothesis, Robert Higgs shows that crises
are a primary driver of government growth.212 According to Higgs,
"Under conditions widely agreed to constitute a national emergency
209 Zeelenberg et al., supra note 194, at 317-23.
210 Cf Hirshleifer, supra note 6, at 864 ("The public wants government to do some-
thing about problems, which implicitly assumes that a useful intervention exists.").
211 Cf Hirshleifer, supra note 6, at 859 (" [T]he costs of a regulation, though widely
incurred, are often far less salient than the exceptional wrongdoings that incited it.").
212 ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987). Higgs defines government growth as a widening of
the scope of the government's effective authority over economic decision making. Id.
at 32.
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. . . Americans both expect and desire the government to 'do some-
thing,' and to do it immediately."213 And while the government often
has the public's support when it responds to an emergency (whether
real or imagined), politicians have frequently used crises to expand
government beyond the scope that informed citizens would likely
accept. Politicians have accomplished this by pursuing policies that
conceal costs, e.g., drafting men into the military rather than paying
soldiers a wage sufficient to persuade them to enlist voluntarily.2 14
Moreover, when a crisis results in a new government program, the
program's benefits become visible while its opportunity costs remain
invisible.215 As a result, many programs become entrenched and im-
possible to eliminate even though doing so would benefit society. In
particular, the federal government's response to the two world wars
and the Great Depression substantially and permanently increased
213 Id. at 63-64.
214 Id. at 62-67. A popular method of concealing costs is to substitute elements of a
command economy for the market economy. The military draft is an example. Simi-
larly, during the Woodrow Wilson administration, Congress passed the Adamson Act,
which temporarily required railroad companies to pay their employees an increased
wage. Congress adopted the Act to avoid a nationwide strike threatened by the rail-
road employees. As an alternative measure, Congress could have supplemented the
pay of the railroad employees using tax dollars. But this would have made the cost of
the Act explicit and would have shifted the cost to taxpayers. Id. at 116-21. For further
discussion of the use of regulation to conceal costs, see supra note 137.
215 See id. at 69 ("People are less likely to object to an established policy, complete
with an administrative bureaucracy and a group of dependent beneficiaries, than to
an equally costly proposed policy.") Higgs also emphasizes that government pro-
grams created during a crisis become entrenched due to changes in prevailing ideol-
ogy resulting from the crisis and the polity's experience with the programs. Id. at 67-
74.
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the scope and importance of the military-industrial complex, the fed-
eral income tax, the welfare state, agricultural policy, labor laws, and
numerous other government activities and programs. 216
The Availability Heuristic
The availability heuristic is the tendency to estimate the im-
portance and frequency of an event based upon how easy it is to re-
call examples of it.217 The availability heuristic causes people to over-
estimate risks that are particularly vivid and salient. The use of this
heuristic can lead to availability cascades, which are "self-reinforcing
process[es] of collective belief formation by which an expressed per-
ception triggers a chain reaction that gives the perception increasing
plausibility through its rising availability in public discourse." 218
An availability cascade generally involves an informational com-
ponent, which occurs because people who have limited information
accept something as true based on the perception that others believe
it. It also includes a reputational component, which occurs because
people refuse to publicly express their doubts about a popular belief
due to social pressure to conform.219 Availability entrepreneurs, in-
cluding members of special interest groups, sometimes try to trigger
availability cascades to advance their agendas. 220
216 Id. at 123-236. In addition, Higgs describes in detail how the world wars and the
Great Depression produced changes in constitutional law that dramatically and per-
manently increased the government's power to interfere with private property rights
and freedom of contract.
217 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 11 (Daniel Kahne-
man et al. eds., 1982).
218 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 683.
219 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 720-28.
220 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 713-14.
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Availability cascades can result in mass scares about minor risks,
especially if those risks are vivid and newsworthy. Examples include
the public panics related to Alar, a pesticide used on apples, and the
Love Canal chemical waste site.221 Neither of these panics was based
on scientific evidence of dangerous risks. Instead, the risks involved
became greatly exaggerated in public discourse due largely to the ef-
forts of availability entrepreneurs who worked to draw attention to
them.222
Availability cascades and opportunity cost neglect may interact
to increase the demand for regulation. During an availability cas-
cade, the media will often tout a proposed governmental response to
the risk in question, but the news coverage generally fails to mention
the opportunity costs of intervention.223 This causes government ac-
tion to appear more desirable than it would if tradeoffs were explicit.
Moreover, because availability cascades occur with respect to some
risks but not others, the resulting pattern of regulation can appear
nonsensical. For example, some regulations in the United States cost
$10 million per life saved, while others cost $100,000 per life saved.224
Similarly, nuclear power is popular and widespread in France but
very limited in the United States, where it arouses considerable
fear.225
221 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 691-701.
22 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 721.
223 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 691-701.
2 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 744; Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note
5, at 1061-63.
2 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 745.
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Tax Salience Effects
Many advocates of limited government have argued that the
government's use of low-salience taxes causes voters to systemati-
cally underestimate the cost of government in dollar terms.226 The
idea is that politicians use complex tax structures, indirect taxes, and
other deceptive techniques to hide the true cost of government and
to make the government larger than voters would prefer if they were
fully informed. Some empirical evidence is consistent with the hy-
pothesis, but the studies generally cannot rule out alternative expla-
nations.227 For example, consistent with the hypothesis, some studies
show that communities with complex tax systems tend to have larger
public budgets. But this finding is also consistent with the notion
that voters who prefer a large government also prefer a more com-
plicated and diversified revenue system.m2
In any event, tax salience effects and opportunity cost neglect are
distinct phenomena. Any underestimation of the cost of government
that results from low-salience taxes could be avoided simply by mak-
ing each voter aware of exactly how much government costs in dollar
terms. But this solution would not cure opportunity cost neglect. In
experiments involving consumption decisions, people often fail to
consider opportunity costs even when the dollar price of the focal
option is clearly stated.229 Similarly, presenting each voter with a
summary of the government's budget or a report specifying how
226 For reviews of the literature on tax salience and the related concept of fiscal illu-
sion, see Gamage & Shanske, supra note 107, at 33-54; MUELLER, supra note 27, at 527-
29, and Dollery & Worthington, supra note 107.
27 Dollery & Worthington, supra note 107, at 293-94; see also Gamage & Shanske,
supra note 107, at 33-54;.
m Dollery & Worthington, supra note 107, at 270-71.
2 See supra Part IlI.
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much tax that he pays may cause some people to think about the op-
portunity costs of government programs, but the effect might not be
dramatic. Facilitating widespread opportunity cost consideration
might instead require explicitly referring to alternative uses of tax
revenues.
Although they are different phenomena, distortions produced by
low-salience taxes and opportunity cost neglect are related. If a voter
underestimates his tax bill or the overall dollar cost of government,
then even if he habitually considers opportunity costs, he will still
underestimate the sacrifice required to make government programs
possible. Moreover, low-salience taxes and opportunity cost neglect
work in the same direction. They both artificially increase the de-
mand for government.
Underestimation of Government's Benefits
While some scholars claim that voters underestimate the cost of
government, others counter that voters underestimate government's
benefits.230 These scholars claim that the benefits of government are
often distant in time, indirect, and otherwise nonobvious. As a re-
sult, voters may overlook them.
In a recent article, Yair Listokin and David Schizer go so far as to
argue that the government should use marketing techniques to in-
crease the salience of the benefits it provides.231 Among other initia-
tives, Listokin and Schizer advocate advertising campaigns that
trumpet popular government programs; placing slogans such as
"Support our Troops" on tax forms; requiring tax software compa-
nies to generate "taxpayer receipts" that specify how much of a tax-
payer's payment goes to national defense, education, and so forth;
23 E.g., Gamage & Shanske, supra note 107, at 91-95; Anthony Downs, Why the Gov-
ernment is Too Small in a Democracy, 12 WORLD POL. 541 (1960).
231 Listokin & Schizer, supra note 9.
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and allowing taxpayers to designate the programs on which part of
their tax dollars will be spent.232
Opportunity cost neglect presents an obvious challenge to those
who want to increase the salience of government's benefits. If the
goal is for the government to adopt policies that rational voters
would support, then opportunity cost neglect and the tendency to
underestimate government's benefits work in opposite directions.233
Any tendency to underestimate government's benefits results in too
little support for government. At the same time, opportunity cost
neglect results in too much support for government. So whether vot-
ers are too supportive of government or not supportive enough is
theoretically indeterminate.
Nonetheless, between 2009 and 2012 the federal government ran
budget deficits totaling nearly $5.5 trillion, and the debt to GDP ratio
has spiked to its highest level since the World War II era.23 Moreo-
ver, absent substantial spending cuts or tax increases, the Congres-
sional Budget Office projects even larger deficits in the future.235 The
federal government is on an unsustainable fiscal path that will re-
quire painful sacrifices that Americans do not currently appear will-
ing to make.23 6 Given this, pursuing policies that will increase the
232 Listokin & Schizer, supra note 9, at 204-15.
2 Cf Gregory Besharov, Second-Best Considerations in Correcting Cognitive Biases, 71
S. EcON. J. 12, 15-19 (2004) (arguing that departures from rationality do not always lead
to suboptimal choices by consumers because one failure of rationality may offset an-
other).
234 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES: FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET OF
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 24-25 (2013); CBO, supra note 112, at 10 (2013). Over the next
few years, the CBO expects the budget deficit to decline due to the improving econ-
omy, recent tax increases, and the waning effects of recessionary spending policies.
But absent substantial changes in the law, the decline will be short lived. CBO, supra
note 112, at 8-12.
2 CBO, supra note 112, at 8-12.
236 CBO, supra note 112, at 6.
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demand for government programs seems inadvisable, particularly in
the absence of evidence that the public will also assent to significantly
higher taxes.27
In addition, the techniques that Listokin and Schizer propose for
increasing the salience of government's benefits would mislead the
public. People often passively accept the frame or characterization
of the problem provided to them.3 8 How voters perceive govern-
ment spending will depend largely on how it is framed. Listokin and
Schizer propose that the government frame its spending positively
by describing spending categories in benign terms like "national de-
fense," "job and family security," and "education and job train-
ing."239 But critics of government spending could make an equally
plausible claim for very different labels. For example, rather than
notify a taxpayer of how much of his tax bill goes to pay for "national
defense," a critic of military spending might favor the phrase "waste-
ful expenditures on unnecessary weapons" or "transfers to wealthy
defense contractors." These labels would no doubt elicit a much dif-
ferent reaction than the labels that Listokin and Schizer propose. Yet
we have no reason to believe that Listokin's and Schizer's labels are
better in the sense that they will make public opinion more rational.
Listokin and Schizer endorse one tactic in particular that is espe-
cially troubling. They point out that charities often use phrases such
as "for the cost of your morning coffee you could feed 8 children for
one day." 240 They encourage the government to follow suit and use
237 In defense of Listokin and Schizer, their stated goal is reducing opposition to
taxes rather than increasing demand for spending. Listokin & Schizer, supra note 9, at
180-81. Nonetheless, their proposals would clearly have the latter effect. As a result,
I suspect that taking their advice would worsen rather than improve current fiscal
problems. In any event, given the severity of those problems, the burden of proof
should be on Listokin and Schizer to show otherwise.
23 See supra Part II.A.
239 Listokin & Schizer, supra note 9, at 195.
240 Listokin & Schizer, supra note 9, at 194.
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similar tactics to promote government programs. But the public al-
ready suffers from a general tendency to ignore opportunity costs.
Actively minimizing the sacrifices required by government spending
will exacerbate this problem. The solution to opportunity cost ne-
glect is to find ways to get voters to consider the best alternatives to
government action. Focusing the public's attention on trivial or un-
attractive alternatives like buying more coffee is deceptive. More
generally, because people tend to focus on salient aspects of a deci-
sion, especially those factors made explicit by the decision frame, fa-
cilitating rational decision making requires presenting voters with a
balanced description of government programs, including not only
their benefits but also their opportunity costs.
B. Slack among Politicians and Bureaucrats
Up to this point, I have focused on voters' policy preferences,
which are important because public opinion significantly influences
government policy. 241 But in a representative democracy, politicians
have some slack to deviate from the policies that voters would adopt
in a direct democracy and to implement the politicians' own agenda.
Public-spirited politicians might even use their slack to save an irra-
tional public from itself. Because they are better educated than the
typical voter, politicians and the experts on whom they rely are more
likely than voters to engage in cost-benefit analysis, including think-
ing about the opportunity costs of government programs. Paradoxi-
cally, by refusing to give voters what they want, politicians might
cause democracy to function better.
241 E.g., SOMIN, supra note 31, at 6, 97; Blinder & Krueger, supra note 15, at 328; JAMES
STIMSON, TIDES OF CONSENT (2004).
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An important source of slack is the government bureaucracy.
Voters may underestimate the ability of politicians to control admin-
istrative agencies. 242 If so, politicians who want to defy voters'
wishes can delegate disagreeable decisions to the agencies and then
plausibly deny responsibility. 243 So while it may be undemocratic,
politicians could use the bureaucracy to subvert voters' irrational
preferences and thereby facilitate more rational decision making. 244
In particular, because administrative agencies generally have to con-
duct cost-benefit analyses in connection with major regulatory ac-
tions,245 they could limit the harm resulting from voters' opportunity
cost neglect.
There are two major caveats to this analysis. First, politicians
have some slack to implement their own agenda, but their capacity
to defy voters' wishes is limited.246 In particular, politicians probably
242 Bryan Caplan suggests that while politicians in fact have a good deal of control
over the bureaucracy, voters irrationally underestimate how much control politicians
have. CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 172-73. For a discussion of the many ways in which
politicians can hold bureaucrats accountable, see JOHN MANNING & MATTHEW
STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 406-544 (2d ed., 2013). In general, the
public is not good at assessing which outcomes politicians control and which they do
not. The public underestimates politicians' power in certain areas while also blaming
politicians for events over which they exercise little influence. SoMIN, supra note 31,
at 100-02.
243 MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 242, at 353-54; CAPLAN, supra note 6, at
172-76.
244 See CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 172-76; cf Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 737
(arguing that politicians should ignore voters' demands for regulation when those de-
mands are rooted in biased information and that they should instead defer to the fact
findings of scientific experts).
245 MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 242, at 513-32.
246 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 20, 172-76; Paul Burstein, The Impact of Public Opinion
on Public Policy, 56 POL. RESEARCH Q. 29,36 (2003) ("Public opinion affects policy three-
quarters of the times its impact is gauged; its effect is of substantial policy importance
at least a third of the time, and probably a fair amount more."); Brandice Cannes-
Wrone, Out of Step, Out of Office, Electoral Accountability and House Member Voting, 96
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 127,138 (2002) (" [W]e show that, holding district ideology constant,
in every election between 1956 and 1996 an incumbent's vote share decreased the more
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have slack with respect to issues about which voters are indifferent.
But on issues about which voters care deeply, they will identify and
punish politicians who shirk.
Second, although politicians might use any slack that they pos-
sess to promote the public interest, they may also abuse it, e.g., by
exchanging special interest legislation for campaign contributions. 247
Moreover, while politicians may generally be less susceptible than
the public to certain failures of rationality, they are not immune. Pol-
iticians' irrationality may prevent them from identifying which poli-
cies are in the public interest.248 For example, opportunity cost ne-
glect helps explain why some politicians oppose regulatory reforms
such as shutting down lightly used public transit routes or allowing
transit authorities to reduce operating deficits by charging higher
fares. Politicians often object to this type of reform on the ground
that it will harm the poor.249 In fact, the failure to adopt reforms that
result in more efficient use of society's resources represents a missed
opportunity to help the poor. In particular, the government could
use the money saved through more efficient operation of public
he voted with the extreme of his party [and] the probability [of reelection] decreases
significantly as an incumbent's voting support for his party increases."); WITIMAN,
supra note 33, at 20-30; see also Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 751-52 (discussing the
pressure on congressmen to respond to the public's demand for legislation resulting
from an availability cascade); but see Steven Levitt, How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling
the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology, 86 Am. ECON. REV. 425
(1996) (finding that for U.S. senators, "ideology is the primary determinant" of voting
patterns, that "[1less than one quarter of the weight in the [senator's] decision function
is devoted to voter preferences," and that voter preferences have more influence over
senators in election years and when the senator holds a marginal seat).
247 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 180 ("Do what the public wants when it cares; take
bids from interested parties when it doesn't.").
248 See supra note 6.
249 WINSTON, supra note 135, at 90.
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transit to provide transportation vouchers for low-income travel-
ers.250
Similarly, to the extent that politicians do in fact lack control over
the bureaucracy, bureaucrats may pursue their own agenda even if
it conflicts with the preferences of politicians and voters. As with
politicians, bureaucrats could use this slack to promote the public in-
terest by adopting socially beneficial rules that irrational voters
might find objectionable. On the other hand, bureaucrats might in-
stead be motivated to protect their jobs and salaries or to maximize
the budget and power of their respective agencies. 251 Bureaucrats
may also suffer from "tunnel vision,"252 which is a form of oppor-
tunity cost neglect. Because they believe so strongly in their agency's
mission, they may ignore competing interests and adopt rules that
do more harm than good.
In sum, politicians and bureaucrats probably have some slack to
deviate from voters' policy preferences, but their slack is limited.
Additionally, politicians and bureaucrats may not use any slack that
they have to promote the public interest. So, this slack does not sig-
nificantly reduce concerns about voters' neglect of opportunity costs.
C. Mixed Policy/Outcome Preferences
My analysis up to this point has assumed that voters support
candidates who share their policy preferences. In reality, voters also
focus on outcomes in deciding how to vote.253 This means that poli-
ticians seeking reelection will temper their desire to give voters the
2o WINSTON, supra note 135, at 90.
251 For a review of several models of bureaucratic behavior, see MUELLER, supra note
27, at 359-80.
252 MAXWELL STEARNS & TODD ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 363-66 (2009).
23 SOMIN, supra note 31, at 100-05; CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 158-60. Political scien-
tists refer to voting based on outcomes as "retrospective voting." See generally Richard
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policies that they want by avoiding policies that will lead to noticea-
bly bad outcomes prior to the next election. In particular, politicians
will want to avoid policies that do significant and immediate eco-
nomic damage. As a result, if opportunity cost neglect causes voters
to demand government spending, tax expenditures, and regulation
that would noticeably and immediately harm the economy, then self-
interested politicians will refuse to comply and thereby save the pub-
lic from itself.
Recall that in her survey, Nancy Kraus found that 60% of people
think that you can never spend too much money to reduce the risk
associated with chemicals. Yet the government has not taken the dra-
matic steps necessary to eliminate chemical exposure. Why? One
reason is that politicians understand that doing so would wreak
havoc on the economy. 254 In this instance, keeping voters satisfied
requires ignoring their misguided beliefs. It seems plausible then,
that voters' focus on outcomes may temper the effects of opportunity
cost neglect on public policy.
Nonetheless, a focus on policy outcomes does not render oppor-
tunity cost neglect harmless. Many government programs that vot-
ers demand due to opportunity cost neglect will produce bad out-
Nadeau & Michael Lewis-Beck, National Economic Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections,
63 J. PoL. 159 (2001); David Lanoue, Retrospective Voting and Prospective Voting in Pres-
idential-Year Elections, 47 POL. RESEARCH Q. 193 (1994); Wayne Francis et al., Retrospec-
tive Voting and Political Mobility, 38 AM. J. PoL. SCI. 999 (1994); Brad Lockerbie, The In-
fluence of Levels of Information on the Use of Prospective Evaluations, 13 POL. BEHAVIOR 223
(1991). Illya Somin and Bryan Caplan criticize the notion that retrospective voting
significantly improves democracy. They argue that voters are too uninformed to rec-
ognize which politicians are responsible for what outcomes; voters care about policy,
not just outcomes; and voters have biased views as to what constitutes a good out-
come, e.g., equating passing legislation as a good outcome regardless of consequences.
SOMIN, supra note 31, at 100-05; CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 158-60.
2 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 162.
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comes that are delayed in time or that are otherwise difficult to ob-
serve. For this reason, short-sighted politicians focused on the next
election are likely to acquiesce in these policies.
To illustrate, consider again the evidence that people become less
supportive of the military when they focus their attention on the nec-
essary tradeoffs. It seems likely that opportunity cost neglect has
caused the public to support billions (perhaps hundreds of billions)
of dollars in defense spending that it otherwise would not have tol-
erated. If so, then opportunity cost neglect has led to a welfare-re-
ducing misallocation of resources. Society has had and continues to
have too many guns and too little butter relative to a world popu-
lated by voters unbiased by opportunity cost neglect. But the loss in
welfare has not been obvious to most people. In a wealthy country
like the United States, the effects, although possibly quite large, have
not been devastating, at least not up to this point. Of course, over a
long time period, the country has likely wasted significant resources
on fruitless military efforts that many voters would not have sup-
ported had they focused on the required sacrifices.
D. Malleable Policy Preferences
If irrational voters support politicians whose policy preferences
mirror their own, then democracy may fail to deliver policies that are
in the public interest. But what if politicians can influence voters'
policy preferences? In that case, public-spirited politicians might
persuade voters that their biases cause them to mistakenly support poli-
cies that, though well-intentioned, are inconsistent with the public inter-
est. 255 In other words, political competition might improve the quality of
255 Cf WITrMAN, supra note 33, at 10 (arguing that political entrepreneurs are re-
warded for providing the public with new information).
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democratic outcomes by making it advantageous for politicians to bring vot-
ers' irrational tendencies, including opportunity cost neglect, to their atten-
tion.
The problem with this argument is that politicians who draw at-
tention to the opportunity costs of government programs bear the
burden of overcoming voters' innate tendency to ignore implicit
tradeoffs. A politician might point out that building a new F-35
Fighter requires forgoing numerous public elementary schools. He
might hope to force the public to choose between the two options.
But given that a single vote is not decisive, voters have no incentive
to tolerate politicians who lecture them about tradeoffs.256 On the
contrary, they have every incentive to support politicians who pay
lip service to both education and national defense and who falsely
promise to promote both without painful sacrifices.257
In fact, opportunity cost neglect makes voters more susceptible
to politicians' propaganda.258 In particular, voters are biased in favor
of politicians who promise to solve problems by framing proposals
so that tradeoffs remain implicit. Politicians can promise to do more
2 Cf CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 169 ("Economic issues are important to voters, but
they do not want politicians with economic expertise especially ones who lecture
them and point out their confusions. Instead, the electoral process selects [lawyers]
who are professionally trained to plead cases persuasively and sincerely regardless of
their merits.").
2 Cf CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 166-69 (discussing politicians' incentive to pander
to voter irrationalities because voters shoot the messenger).
2 Bryan Caplan argues that irrationality makes voters susceptible to certain kinds
of messages. For example, if evolution has left the typical person xenophobic, then
voters will be open to propaganda that scapegoats foreigners. CAPLAN, supra note 6,
at 178-79. My argument that voters are open to politicians who exploit opportunity
cost neglect is based on similar logic. See also Hirshleifer, supra note 6, at 857 (" [Cier-
tain beliefs about regulation are especially good at exploiting psychological biases to
attract attention and support.")
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of everything. Alternatively, they can promise to balance the gov-
ernment's budget without pain by eliminating unspecified waste.259
The tendency to neglect opportunity costs means that voters will not
automatically fill in the gap and recognize that pursuing x means giv-
ing up y.
More generally, charismatic politicians might influence voters'
policy preferences through faith and rhetoric. In other words, voters
might change their policy preferences simply because they trust a
politician ("I believe because he said it.") or because a politician is an
eloquent orator ("I believe because he said it so well."). 260 In theory,
a charismatic politician could use his political skills to persuade vot-
ers to adopt more rational policies.
But why fight that battle? Changing voters' minds would re-
quire overcoming the natural tendency to neglect opportunity
costs. 261 Forcing voters to come to grips with the reality that tradeoffs
are inevitable seems a herculean task for even the most gifted politi-
cian. If successful, the likely result would be ambivalence on the part
of the electorate, not exactly a recipe for political success. For this
reason, politicians who nobly address problems in a serious way are
likely to lose elections to politicians who pander to the public's irra-
tional demands.262
259 This message is likely to be especially appealing to Republican voters. See, e.g.,
ANDERSON RoBBINs RESEARCH, supra note 118, at Question 21 (2013) (finding that 58%
of Republicans believe that we could eliminate most of the national debt by cutting
waste and fraud from government compared to only 42% of Democrats),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/interactive/2013/01/18/fox-news-poll-govern-
ment-spending/.
260 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 169-72.
261 Cf Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 694-98 (discussing how the public panic
over the Love Canal chemical waste site placed overwhelming pressure on political
actors to comply with the public's call for action despite the lack of scientific evidence
suggesting that the site was dangerous).
262 See CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 180.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
[Vol. 9:249
OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND
In fact, selection pressure favors politicians who, like voters, fail
to consider the opportunity costs of the policies that they promote. 263
Not only will their message resonate, but these politicians will also
appear more genuine than rational politicians who recognize
tradeoffs but pretend otherwise in order to get elected.
My analysis clarifies why uninformed voters cannot rely on pol-
iticians for advice in the same way that lay people rely on experts in
other fields. Donald Wittman has pointed out that people who know
nothing about medicine can obtain good medical care by consulting
a doctor. 264 Similarly, people who know nothing about predicting
the weather can rely on an experienced weatherman. By analogy,
Wittman argues that voters who know nothing about public policy
can rely on trusted politicians. But the analogy is faulty. Doctors and
weathermen have a strong incentive to tell the truth even if the truth
is unpleasant. A doctor risks her reputation (and a lawsuit) if she
protects her patients' feelings by refusing to disclose when they have
cancer. A weatherman who always predicts sunshine will quickly be
discovered as a fraud. But as long as his policies do not create an
obvious and immediate disaster, a politician who never delivers bad
news about required tradeoffs rarely faces consequences. By the time
the public becomes aware of the adverse effects of excessive spend-
ing, tax expenditures, and regulation, the politicians who pursued
these policies may be retired or otherwise able to plausibly deny re-
sponsibility. In fact, one consequence of excessive government inter-
vention may be substantially slower economic growth, but the public
will never become aware of this cost because it is hidden.
Examples from both the Bush and Obama administrations illus-
trate these points. In 2002 and 2003, President Bush imposed large
263 CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 19-20, 168.
264 WITTMAN, supra note 33, at 57.
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tariffs on imported steel. 2 65 Economists strongly oppose tariffs and
similar restrictions on international trade. 266 Textbook economics
demonstrates that tariffs produce a deadweight loss. 267 Their cost to
consumers outweighs the benefits to producers in terms of profit and
to the government in terms of revenue. 268 But in announcing the tar-
iffs to the public, the President did not point out that they would
harm consumers. Instead, the administration's press release stated
the following: "This relief will help steel workers, communities that
depend on steel, and the steel industry .. .without harming our econ-
omy." 269 Economists disagree, but politics required the President to
conceal the required tradeoffs.
President Obama used a similar tactic to facilitate passage of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Prior to the Act's adop-
tion, the President repeatedly stated in unqualified terms that people
who liked their current health insurance policy would be able to keep
265 Richard Stevenson & Elizabeth Becker, After 21 Months, Bush Lifts Tariff on Steel
Imports, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/05/us/after-
21-months-bush-lifts-tariff-on-steel-imports.html; see generally, GARY HUFBAUER AND
BEN GOODRICH, STEEL POLICY: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY (2003),
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb03-1.pdf.
266 As noted above, a survey of members of the American Economic Association
found that 87.5% agreed that the United States should eliminate tariffs and other trade
barriers. Whaples, supra note 39, at 1.
267 BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 165, at 393-97; see also ROBERT CRANDALL,
THE FUTILITY OF STEEL TRADE PROTECTION 9-21 (2002). For an economic analysis of the
Bush steel tariffs published by a trade group critical of the tariffs, see JOSEPH FRANCOIS
& LAURA BAUGHMAN, ESTIMATED ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PROPOSED IMPORT RELIEF
REMEDIES FOR STEEL (2001), http://www.citac.info/steeltaskforce/remedy/.
268 WINSTON, supra note 135, at 24 ("[A] large volume of empirical evidence indi-
cates that trade protection has mainly generated gains to established U.S. industries
that fall far short of the losses to consumers.").
269 Statement by the President, President Announces Temporary Safeguards by the
Steel Industry, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2002/03/20020305-6.html.
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it even if the Act became law. 270 Apparently, the President wanted
to minimize the perception that the law would require significant
sacrifices among the many people who liked their health insurance
coverage.271 In any event, shortly after the Act went into effect, in-
surance companies canceled many existing insurance policies.272 The
President's approval rating dropped precipitously and public sup-
port for the health law declined.273 That the Act would result in can-
celed policies was foreseeable because the law itself makes certain
types of policies illegal. 274 Moreover, prior to the Act's adoption,
members of the Obama administration debated the veracity of the
President's pledge and decided that it would be politically inconven-
ient for him to qualify his position and admit that some people would
lose their existing coverage. 275
Perhaps the President himself knew that his promise was mis-
leading, or perhaps he simply failed to think through the Act's con-
sequences. Either way, like the Bush steel tariff example, the incident
270 Colleen Nelson et al., Aides Debated Obama Health-Care Coverage Promise, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 2, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023038
43104579172002892623382.
271 See, e.g., John Harwood, Don't Dare Call the Health Law "Redistribution," N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/us/dont-dare-call-the-
health-law-redistribution.html.
272 Carol Lee & Louise Radnofsky, White House to Allow Insurers to Continue Canceled
Health Plans, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles
/SB10001424052702303789604579197733759439274.
273 E.J. Dionne, Jr., Obama Needs His Friends Back, WASH. PosT, Nov. 13, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ej-dionne-obama-needs-his-friends-
back/2013/11/13/5ffe59b84c95-11e3-ac54-aa84301ced81_story.html; Gallup, Ameri-
cans' Approval of Healthcare Law Declines (2013), http://www.gallup.com/
poll/165863/americans-approval-healthcare-law-declines.aspx.
274 Colleen Nelson & Peter Nicholas, Obama Recalibrates "Keep Your Insurance"
Pledge, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/ news/articles/
SB10001424052702303661404579180251662058412; Nelson et al., supra note 270.
275 Nelson et al., supra note 270.
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reveals the political advantages of concealing tradeoffs from voters.
Although the public ultimately found out the truth, the discovery
came only after President Obama had secured reelection and passage
of his signature legislation.
The fact that President Obama's promise turned out to be untrue
does not necessarily mean that the Affordable Care Act is bad policy.
Supporters of the Act might hold it up as an instance in which de-
ceiving the public was justifiable because the public fails to appreci-
ate the Act's benefits. I leave it up to the reader to assess the merits
of that argument. My only point is that the President exploited op-
portunity cost neglect and marketed the law to voters by concealing
its tradeoffs. Moreover, contrary to Donald Wittman's claims, voters
can be surprised by important aspects of a particular law even when
the law itself was the subject of intense public debate and even when
its consequences were obvious to experts prior to passage.
V. OPPORTUNITY COST NEGLECT, THE FREE MARKET, AND LIMITED
GOVERNMENT
We have seen that opportunity cost neglect causes voters to eval-
uate government programs without reference to implicit tradeoffs,
which causes government spending, tax expenditures, and regula-
tion to appear more desirable than they otherwise would. Oppor-
tunity cost neglect and other failures of rationality provide support
for the proposition that the policies that voters actually support will
deviate significantly from the policies that they would support if they
were rational. In fact, some behavioral public choice scholars argue
that contrary to conventional wisdom, irrationality strengthens the
case for a free market in which the government plays only a limited
role.276
276 See supra note 6.
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Nonetheless, skeptics of the free market might point out that ir-
rationality affects consumers as well as voters. So how are we to
know whether society will be better off with more government or
less? This Article does not resolve that question definitively. How-
ever, I do believe that there are reasons to suspect that irrationality is
more detrimental to democracy than to the free market.27 To illus-
trate why, I will compare the consequences of consumers' neglect of
opportunity costs with that of voters.
I do not deny that opportunity cost neglect probably impairs the
functioning of the market. Just as voters tend to evaluate govern-
ment programs without reference to implicit opportunity costs, con-
sumers may evaluate consumer goods without considering the sac-
rifices that they entail. One consequence could be excessive con-
sumer spending relative to a world in which consumers behaved ra-
tionally.278
Nonetheless, the negative effects of opportunity cost neglect are
likely less severe for the free market than for democracy. Voters gen-
erally have less incentive to recognize their irrationality and to find
ways to overcome it than do consumers who are making decisions
that directly affect themselves. 279 In particular, as discussed in Part
II, voters are less likely than consumers to think about opportunity
costs. People are more likely to consider opportunity costs when
277 Cf Hirshleifer, supra note 6, at 857 ("[A] behavioral approach suggests that even
though markets work imperfectly, the political process usually works even worse.");
CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 114-41 (arguing that people are particularly likely to act ir-
rationally when voting because of the low private cost).
278 See supra Part III.A.1.
279 Glaeser, supra note 6, at 13942 (citing evidence that increased incentives reduce
cognitive errors and concluding that "political beliefs should be particularly erroneous
because voters lack the incentives to learn the truth (after all one vote doesn't deter-
mine anything)"); Caplan, Rational Irrationality, supra note 38, at 14-20 (citing evidence
that a low private cost increases irrationality).
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they face immediate resource constraints. Many consumers face re-
source constraints that force them to think about tradeoffs, especially
when they contemplate large purchases. Access to credit may relax
resource constraints for some consumers, but consumer credit is lim-
ited. By contrast, because one vote is usually not decisive, voting for
more government spending has no effect on a particular voter's tax
bill. In other words, voters are completely unconstrained. From the
perspective of each individual voter, a vote in favor of more govern-
ment spending has no personal cost.
A second reason that opportunity cost neglect harms democracy
more than the free market is that even if consumers ignore oppor-
tunity costs, other forces curb consumer spending. Unfortunately,
these same forces do not curb government spending. For example,
many consumers experience psychological pain when they pay for
goods and services. 280 The pain of paying varies from person to per-
son and is also influenced by situational factors such as the method
of payment and whether the consumer believes that he is getting a
good deal. In any event, the pain of paying reduces enjoyment of
consumer goods and makes people less likely to buy them. In fact,
because thinking about opportunity costs is a difficult cognitive task,
people may consciously or unconsciously substitute the pain of pay-
ing as a method to keep spending under control.281
'0 For discussions of the pain of paying, see generally Rick et al., supra note 90; Dra-
zen Pralec & George Loewenstein, The Red and the Black: Mental Accounting of Savings
and Debt, 17 MARKETING Sci. 4 (1998). See also George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue,
"We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way": Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and
the Law, 73 CHI. L. REV. 183, 194-2000 (2006).
28 Rick et al., supra note 90, at 768 ("If people relied solely on cognitively nebulous
representations of forgone consumption, most people would likely spend compul-
sively [but] [olne way that consumers can solve this problem is the cultivation of neg-
ative emotions in response to the prospect of spending."); Loewenstein & O'Do-
noghue, supra note 280, at 195 (noting that the pain of paying serves "as a proxy for
forgone consumption"); Pralec & Loewenstein, supra note 280, at 25 ("The functional
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People may also feel negative emotions when they pay taxes, but
these emotions are not likely to be an effective check on government
spending. In consumer transactions, payment and receipt of the
good are often tightly connected. This means that payment is partic-
ularly likely to reduce enjoyment of the good, which will in turn re-
duce purchases. 282 On the other hand, the payment of taxes generally
is not closely connected with the receipt of government benefits,
which has the effect of making government benefits seem free and
therefore more enjoyable. 283
The disconnect between taxes and government benefits may also
make taxes particularly painful. Unlike payments for consumer
goods, a tax payment is not clearly associated with the receipt of a
benefit that can buffer the psychological burden imposed by the pay-
ment.2M But this feature of taxation, while it no doubt increases peo-
ple's hatred for taxes, does not necessarily reduce the demand for
public goods. Again, the relationship between loathsome taxes and
public goods is not always obvious so that people may not always
draw the connection between support for government spending and
higher taxes.
The preceding analysis helps explain why Republican voters
take incongruous positions in opinion polls. Republicans claim to be
concerned about the budget deficit. At the same time, they do not
favor tax increases, and while they are less supportive of government
spending than Democrats, Republicans too oppose spending cuts for
role of the pain of payment is to counteract biases . . . that would otherwise lead to
chronic overspending.").
282 Pralec & Loewenstein, supra note 280, at 8-25.
283 Pralec & Loewenstein, supra note 280, at 8-25.
281 Cf Pralec & Loewenstein, supra note 280, at 23 (discussing survey evidence that
people dislike credit card debt more than other types of debt and explaining that this
is because people regard payments on credit card debt as "a loathsome tax, divorced
from specific consumption benefits").
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nearly all government programs.285 Apparently, Republicans' dis-
dain for taxes curbs their appetite for government spending only to
a very limited extent. The pain that Republicans experience when
they pay taxes does not translate into support for significant spend-
ing cuts.
In addition, people do not pay taxes when they cast their votes.
Any pain that voters feel when paying taxes may fade by the time
they reach the voting booth. If so, it will not influence which politi-
cians they support.
Moreover, even if the pain of paying taxes reduces support for
government spending, it will not reduce support for regulations or
tax expenditures. In fact, to the irrational voter, regulations and tax
expenditures often serve as an attractive substitute for government
spending. Action bias causes voters to demand that the government
solve perceived problems. But some voters favor solutions that do
not involve government spending because they associate more
spending with more taxes, to which they have a strong aversion.286
This phenomenon helps explain the high levels of public support for
government regulation. It also helps explain why Republicans are
especially likely to find government subsidies more appealing if they
occur in the form of tax expenditures rather than direct spending. 287
2 See supra Part III.A.2.
26 See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 107, at 49-54 (reviewing the empirical evi-
dence for "tax-label aversion").
2 For experimental evidence that Republicans are more likely to support tax ex-
penditures than similar direct spending programs, see Faricy & Ellis, supra note 96, at
71-72 (" [W]e find that the effects of the delivery-mechanism frame on support for so-
cial programs was conditioned by partisanship. The fact that the effects of the deliv-
ery-mechanism frame were stronger for Republicans than Democrats could serve as
an explanation for why Republicans, generally opposed to the idea of 'big govern-
ment,' also on balance report preferences for higher levels of government spending on
specific social programs . . .. At least some Republicans might view tax expenditure
policy as a way to have its policy cake and eat it, too: providing desirable social
benefits while still adhering to the values of individual initiative and support for the
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Republicans are particularly fond of government intervention that
does not appear to require tax increases, and tax expenditures seem
to fit the bill (unless you stop to consider the possibility that the gov-
ernment will make up for the lost revenue by increasing tax rates or
by engaging in deficit spending, which necessitates future tax in-
creases).
A third reason that opportunity cost neglect harms democracy
more than the free market relates to the extent of the damage result-
ing from it. Consumers who ignore opportunity costs will spend ex-
cessively. They will buy too many goods and services and pay too
much for them. But in the process, they will harm only themselves
and perhaps their families. Voters who ignore opportunity costs will
support too much government spending, which harms the entire
country.288 In particular, if people vote altruistically and support pol-
icies that they believe are in the public interest, then opportunity cost
neglect will cause them to make choices for which the costs to society
substantially outweigh the benefits.
To illustrate, imagine that a particular voter supports a war be-
cause its seemingly well-intentioned proponents claim that national
security is at stake. The voter puts faith in politicians and pundits
that he trusts and ignores the opportunity costs of military action. To
this voter, war appears to be the best option, not only for himself but
also for everyone else. In fact, he is wrong and the war's aggregate
costs substantially exceed its benefits. If a majority of other voters
private sector."). As discussed supra note 131, Republican support for tax expendi-
tures may result partly from a failure to code tax expenditures as a government pro-
gram. But the phenomenon also stems from opportunity cost neglect.
2 Cf Caplan, Majorities against Utility, supra note 34, at 207-08 (pointing out that
"voting for bad policies has a built-in negative externality" because it hurts everyone);
CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 145-47 (discussing how even mild irrationality among voters
may have dramatic adverse effects on society).
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make the same mistake and if democratic government gives voters
what they want, then the country will go to war and society will suf-
fer.289 Each voter's miscalculation is magnified and affects not only
him but the public generally, including those people who rationally
oppose military action.
CONCLUSION
Legal scholars have generally used evidence of irrationality to
bolster the argument for government intervention. This Article ar-
gues instead that irrationality may in fact strengthen the case for lim-
ited government. Market outcomes are not perfect, but government
intervention will sometimes make matters worse. Because of irra-
tionality, the policies that voters actually support will frequently di-
verge from the policies that voters would support if they were ra-
tional. So even if democracy delivers to voters the policies that they
demand, government will often fail to act in the public interest. At
the very least, irrationality in political processes justifies a cautious
approach to government intervention and careful analysis of pro-
posed policies on a case-by-case basis.
In particular, this Article argues that opportunity cost neglect ad-
versely affects democracy. Voters tend to ignore the implicit
tradeoffs associated with government spending, tax expenditures,
and regulation. As a result, government programs have greater ap-
peal than they otherwise would. When researchers and pollsters fo-
cus the public's attention on the sacrifices that government programs
require, support for them declines substantially. Unfortunately, ac-
2 Cf Caplan, Rational Irrationality, at 20 ("It is cheap for an individual to irration-
ally underestimate the costs of war, but if enough people buy this opinion the result
could be disaster.").
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tual voter behavior will not reflect careful consideration of oppor-
tunity costs. The circumstances that cause people to think about op-
portunity costs are absent from the voting context.
In addition, opportunity cost neglect interacts with other biases
and with heuristics that voters sometimes invoke. On the one hand,
the intentions heuristic, antimarket bias, action bias, the availability
heuristic, and low-salience taxes tend to exacerbate the effects of op-
portunity cost neglect. On the other hand, any tendency among vot-
ers to underestimate the benefits of government will counteract their
neglect of opportunity costs. Future research should focus on which
of these forces exerts more influence over voters' policy preferences.
In the meantime, opportunity cost neglect poses a significant chal-
lenge to those scholars who have proposed policies that would in-
crease support for government by making its benefits more salient to
voters.
Finally, the influence of politicians and bureaucrats over the pol-
icymaking process does not alleviate concerns about voters' oppor-
tunity cost neglect. Politicians and bureaucrats may have some slack
to deviate from voters' policy preferences. But their slack is limited.
In addition, politicians and bureaucrats may not use any slack that
they possess to promote the public interest. They may instead suc-
cumb to the influence of special interest groups, or they may them-
selves suffer from failures of rationality, including opportunity cost
neglect, that render their policy preferences just as flawed as those of
the typical voter.
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